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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] In July 2005, “reformed” hacker Albert Gonzalez noticed an 
insecure wireless network at a Marshalls department store in Miami.1  
After exploiting the vulnerability, Gonzalez and his accomplices installed 
programs that captured credit card numbers.2  They stored the credit card 
numbers on servers in Latvia and Ukraine, created ATM cards using some 
of the numbers, and used those cards to withdraw hundreds of thousands 
 
                                                                                                                         
* J.D. Candidate 2010, William Mitchell College of Law; M.S., Information Networking, 
Carnegie Mellon University, 2004; B.S., Mathematics/Computer Science, Carnegie 
Mellon University, 1994.  The author gratefully acknowledges advice from Professor 
David J. Prince. 
1
 Brad Stone, Global Trail of an Online Crime Ring, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/technology/12theft.html (reporting 
federal indictments against Mr. Gonzalez).  After an arrest on credit-card fraud charges in 
2003, Gonzalez made a deal to avoid prison time by helping federal agents track down 
credit-card traffickers.  See id.  
2
 Id. 
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of dollars in cash.3  Fifteen months later, Marshalls’ parent company, TJX, 
announced that forty-five million of its customers’ credit card numbers 
had been exposed to the thieves.4 
 
[2] Data broker ChoicePoint collects information on nearly every adult 
in the United States.5   It gathers and aggregates data anywhere it can find 
it, including motor vehicle records, police records, property records, court 
records, and credit histories.6  These records include all the details 
necessary to set up new credit accounts, such as Social Security numbers, 
birth dates, addresses, mothers’ maiden names, and driver’s license 
numbers.7  In 2004, ChoicePoint discovered that some clients who had 
claimed to be small businesses were actually data thieves.8  A year later, 
ChoicePoint admitted to selling hundreds of thousands of records to these 
thieves.9  As a result, over 800 people suffered identity fraud.10   
 
 
                                                                                                                         
3
 Id. 
4
 Id. Gonzalez was arrested in his hotel room in May, 2008.  Id.  At the time of his arrest, 
his hotel room contained two laptops, over $20,000 in cash, and a gun.  Id. 
5
 Gary Rivlin, Keeping Your Enemies Close: The Rehabilitation Of a Data Company, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2006, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/12/business/yourmoney/12choice.html.  ChoicePoint 
was spun off from credit reporting agency Equifax in 1997.  Id. 
6
 See id. 
7
 Id.  
8
 See Tom Zeller, Jr., Release of Consumers’ Data Spurs ChoicePoint Inquiries, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2005, at C2, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/05/business/05choice.html.   
9
 Rivlin, supra note 5. 
10
 See id.; Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security 
Breach Charges; to Pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress 
(Jan. 26, 2006), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm (last visited Sept. 28, 
2009). 
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[3] These examples illustrate how data collection can lead to identity 
fraud.11  The chain of events begins when an organization collects 
sensitive data.  At some point, a breach occurs, and the organization loses 
control of that data.  When a third party obtains and misuses the breached 
information, harms result.  Identity fraud, often called “identity theft”,12 is 
one of the main forms of these harms.13 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
11
 See, e.g., N. MITCHISON ET AL, EUROPEAN COMM’N JOINT RESEARCH CTR. IDENTITY 
THEFT: A DISCUSSION PAPER 5 (2004), https://prime-
project.eu/community/furtherreading/studies/IDTheftFIN.pdf. 
12
 The term “identity theft” is popularly used to describe frauds resulting from misuse of 
identifying data.  See, e.g., Holly K. Towle, Identity Theft: Myths, Methods, and New 
Law, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 237, 241–44 (2004).  However, others have 
used the term “identity fraud,” and the entire field of research suffers from a lack of 
agreement on exactly what “identity theft” is.  See, e.g., MITCHISON, supra note 11, at 5; 
FIDIS CONSORTIUM ON D5.2B: ID-RELATED CRIME: TOWARDS A COMMON GROUND FOR 
INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH 5, 10–15 (2006), 
http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp5-del5.2b.ID-related_crime.pdf; 
Bob Sullivan, Just How Common is ID Theft?, MSNBC, June 30, 2005, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8409283 (last visited Sept. 28, 2009) (noting that surveys 
of identity theft disagree on the definition of the term).  This note uses the term “identity 
fraud,” except when referring to decisions in court cases where the more common term is 
used.  “Identity theft” is not theft and it does not involve one’s identity.  See L. JEAN 
CAMP, ECONOMICS OF IDENTITY THEFT: AVOIDANCE, CAUSES AND POSSIBLE CURES 17 
(2007).  As some commentators have pointed out, an identity is more like intellectual 
property than real property in that most “identity theft” cases involve copying identifying 
information, not stealing it.  See, e.g., FIDIS CONSORTIUM, supra, at 5, 10–15.  The word 
“identity” is also debatable.  Most cases of fraud exploit poor methods of authenticating 
identity, not the victim’s actual identity.  See id.  Many discussions of the topic also 
confuse identity with identification.  One’s identity is more than just a set of data about 
that person.  See, e.g., Stacey L. Schreft, Risks of Identity Theft: Can the Market Protect 
the Payment System?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CITY ECON. REV., Oct. 2007, at 5, 6, 
available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/Publicat/Econrev/PDF/4q07schreft.pdf.  To 
paraphrase Yoda: luminous beings are we, not this crude data.  See GEORGE LUCAS, 
LAURENCE KASDAN & LEIGH BRACKETT, STAR WARS EPISODE V: THE EMPIRE STRIKES 
BACK (1980), available at http://www.imsdb.com/scripts/Star-Wars-The-Empire-Strikes-
Back.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2009). 
13
 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
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[4] Consumers who find out that their data has been mishandled 
respond in a number of ways.  Some simply ignore the breach notice.14  
Some avail themselves of a free year or two of credit monitoring, a 
customary offering by breached organizations.15  Some want more than a 
year or two of credit monitoring—and some of those sue the breached 
organization for those costs.16 
 
[5] One theory put forward in these lawsuits is that negligent 
organizations should pay for the costs of monitoring to detect or prevent 
identity fraud.17  Plaintiffs have analogized these “data monitoring” claims 
to the medical monitoring claims in toxic torts.18  Among other 
similarities, both claims involve initial exposures that can lead to remote 
harms.19  So far, however, courts have rejected this analogy.20 
 
[6] This article examines the arguments for and against recovery of 
data monitoring costs.  Part II gives some background on the claims, first 
highlighting attempts to recover monitoring costs after data breaches, then 
discussing medical monitoring claims and some of the benefits and 
problems with these claims. Part III compares data monitoring claims to 
medical monitoring claims by examining the analogy and comparing the 
 
                                                                                                                         
14
 See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 913, 952 (2007) (noting that more than thirty-nine percent of respondents 
in a survey said they had mistaken a breach notification letter for junk mail). 
15
 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, PERSONAL INFORMATION: DATA 
BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL 
EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 35 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 GAO Report] (noting that it has 
become “standard practice” for entities that experience a breach to offer free credit 
monitoring after a breach). 
16
 See discussion, infra Part II.A. 
17
 See id. 
18
 See id. 
19
 See id. 
20
 See id. 
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underlying policy arguments for each. Part IV proposes a model for 
evaluating non-medical monitoring claims based on whether those costs 
were reasonably necessary. Part V then applies this model to data 
monitoring costs by examining the costs and probabilities involved, and 
shows that these do not currently justify awarding the costs of data 
monitoring. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  DATA BREACH SUBJECTS’ ATTEMPTS TO RECOVER THE COSTS OF  
RESPONDING TO A BREACH 
 
[7] Because identity fraud may not develop until years after a data 
breach,21 data breach victims have used a number of novel theories in 
attempting to recover damages for the breaches themselves.  Plaintiffs 
have sought recovery for increased risk of identity fraud,22 fear of identity 
fraud,23 and cost of efforts to reduce their risk of identity fraud.24  These 
 
                                                                                                                         
21
 See Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1234–38 (2003); Identity Theft: Restoring Your Good Name: 
Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and Government 
Information, 107th Cong. 12 (2003) (statement of Howard Beales, Director, FTC Bureau 
of Consumer Protection) (testifying that five percent of identity theft victims were 
unaware of the theft five years after it happened, and that the average time to detect an 
identity theft was twelve months). 
22
 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Shafran v. 
Harley-Davidson, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 01365(GBD), 2008 WL 763177, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 20, 2008); Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.C. 
2007); Ponder v. Pfizer, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 793, 796 (M.D. La. 2007); Key v. DSW, 
Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 686 (S.D. Ohio 2006). 
23
 See, e.g., Melancon v. La. Office of Student Fin. Assistance, 567 F. Supp. 2d 873, 874 
(E.D. La. 2008); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp., 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007); 
Ponder, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 796. 
24
 See, e.g., Pinero v. Jackson-Hewitt Tax Serv., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 710, 714 (E.D. La. 
2009); Shafran, 2008 WL 763177, at *1; Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632; Stollenwerk v. Tri-
West Health Care Alliance, 254 Fed.Appx. 664, 665 (9th Cir. 2007); Randolph, 486 F. 
Supp. 2d at 4; Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709 (S.D. Ohio 
2007); Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020 (D. Minn. 2006); 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XVI, Issue 1 
 6
claims mimic, respectively, the toxic tort theories of enhanced risk, fear of 
future harm, and medical monitoring.25  Although these theories have 
gained some acceptance in the context of physical harms,26 they have 
proven much less helpful for data breach plaintiffs. Few of these claims 
have survived summary judgment or motions to dismiss.27 
 
[8] Courts have rejected these claims for a number of reasons.  Many 
found the harm too speculative to confer standing, especially when 
plaintiffs claimed increased risk or emotional harms.28  Even when 
plaintiffs have sought the cost of measures to avoid identity fraud, courts 
typically have found these efforts not to be harms themselves, but merely 
voluntary actions taken in anticipation of potential future harm.29  Some 
 
                                                                                                                         
Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., Inc., No. Civ. 05-668 RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 
288483, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006); Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. 06-476 
(JBS), 2006 WL 2177036, at *2 (D.N.J. July 31, 2006); Key, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 686. 
25
 See generally L. NEAL ELLIS, JR. & CHARLES D. CASE, TOXIC TORT AND HAZARDOUS 
SUBSTANCE LITIGATION §§ 6-1 to 6-4 (1995). 
26
 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
27
 See, e.g., Pinero, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 718–19 (granting summary judgment to defendant 
for contract claims including expenses for credit monitoring); Kahle, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 
709–13 (granting summary judgment to defendant where plaintiff argued for the cost of 
credit monitoring as a harm); Giordano, 2006 WL 2177036, at *5 (remanding to state 
court for lack of standing, where plaintiff’s only claimed harm was the cost of money 
spent to prevent identity fraud); Key, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 685 (dismissing a claim seeking 
recovery for the increased risk of identity fraud). But see Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 
433, 438 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that a plaintiff who alleged identity fraud had standing 
to sue for the cost of credit monitoring); Ruiz, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 1126 (holding that a 
pre-trial motion to dismiss was too early a stage to dismiss a claim for increased risk of 
identity fraud because such a risk could be proven as part of the plaintiff’s case). 
28
 See, e.g., Ponder, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 796–98; Randolph, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 8–9; 
Forbes, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1020–21; Guin, 2006 WL 288483 at *3–6. 
29
 See Ponder, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 796–98; Randolph, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 8; Forbes, 420 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1020–21. 
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courts have done little more than survey other states’ positions on credit 
monitoring as a compensable injury.30 
 
[9] But a handful of courts have considered, at least briefly, the 
similarity between claims for medical monitoring and claims for credit 
monitoring.  In Giordano v. Wachovia Securities, L.L.C.,31 the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey became the first court to 
consider the analogy, deeming it “inapt.”32  Just over a month later, in Key 
v. DSW, Inc.,33 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio 
followed suit.  Two other federal courts have noted the analogy when 
rejecting claims.34  
 
[10] The most extensive judicial analysis of the analogy to date appears 
in a case by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Stollenwerk v. 
Tri-West Health Care Alliance.35  The Stollenwerk court denied a claim for 
credit monitoring damages to plaintiffs whose data was on a computer 
stolen from Tri-West because the plaintiffs had not shown that the 
breached information was misused in any way.36  The court held that even 
 
                                                                                                                         
30
 See Pinero, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 715–17; Shafran v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 
01365(GBD), 2008 WL 763177, at *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2008). 
31
 No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036 (D. N.J. July 31, 2006). 
32
 Id. at *3 n.4.  The court rejected the analogy because it found that the plaintiff’s 
allegation of potential identity fraud resulting from data loss was merely an allegation of 
potential exposure, not an allegation of actual exposure required for a medical 
monitoring claim.  Id. 
33
 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 691 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (finding a lack of exposure because 
plaintiff did not allege that her data had been misused). 
34
 See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bank Corp., 499 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2007); Hendricks v. 
DSW Shoe Warehouse Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (W.D. Mich. 2006).  The courts in 
both these cases were applying state law in states that did not recognize claims for 
medical monitoring, and thus found it unlikely that the states would have recognized 
claims for non-medical monitoring costs.  See id.; Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 639. 
35
 254 Fed. Appx. 664 (9th Cir. 2007). 
36
 Id. at 666–67. 
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if credit monitoring damages were available under the same standard as 
medical monitoring claims, the plaintiffs had failed to meet that standard 
because they did not show that the relief sought was necessary.37  The 
court also discussed one of the underlying justifications for medical 
monitoring damages: “to ensure that the cost of testing does not prevent 
plaintiffs from receiving increased medical surveillance that is of actual 
benefit to them.”38  The court rejected the claims because the plaintiffs had 
not shown that “a normally prudent person in these circumstances” would 
have purchased credit monitoring services beyond those that Tri-West 
offered for free.39 
 
[11] Other than Stollenwerk, courts considering the parallel between 
identity monitoring claims and medical monitoring damages have focused 
primarily on the analogy, with particular attention to the issue of 
exposure.40  But this analysis skips a step.  The question should not be 
merely whether data breach is or is not like toxic exposure.  The inquiry 
should instead be based on an evaluation of the arguments for and against 
medical monitoring damages and their applicability in the data breach 
context. 
 
B.  MEDICAL MONITORING 
 
1.  OVERVIEW 
 
[12] Medical monitoring damages allow recovery of the costs of 
medical tests designed to detect and prevent the onset of diseases resulting 
 
                                                                                                                         
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. at 667. 
39
 Id. 
40
 See, e.g., Giordano v. Wachovia Secs., L.L.C., No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036, at *3 
n.4 (D.N.J. July 31, 2006); Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 690–91 (S.D. Ohio 
2006). 
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from the a defendant’s actions.41  Plaintiffs have sought damages for the 
cost of monitoring the long-term effects of physical injuries,42 
pharmaceuticals,43 tobacco,44 insecticides,45 asbestos,46 and other harmful 
substances.47  Although standards for medical monitoring damages vary 
across jurisdictions, a few common elements have emerged.  Recovery of 
medical monitoring costs requires proof that (1) the plaintiff was exposed 
to a toxic substance,48 (2) the exposure resulted from the defendant’s 
negligence,49 (3) the exposure increased50 the plaintiff’s risk of serious 
 
                                                                                                                         
41
 See Richard Bourne, Medical Monitoring Without Physical Injury: The Least Justice 
Can Do for Those Industry Has Terrorized with Poisonous Products, 58 SMU L. REV. 
251, 252 (2005). 
42
 See, e.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 818–
19 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
43
 See, e.g., Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
44
 See, e.g., Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 182 (Or. 2008). 
45
 See, e.g., Villari v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 727, 728 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
46
 See, e.g., Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) 
(allowing damages for procedures to detect and treat diseases arising from asbestos 
exposure). 
47
 See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 835 (3d Cir. 1990) (poly-
chlorinated biphenyls); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 800 (Cal. 
1993) (carcinogenic toxic waste); Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 292 (N.J. 
1987) (various toxic chemicals). 
48
 Hansen  v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993).  Some 
jurisdictions use a higher standard that requires proof of significant exposure.  See, e.g., 
Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852; Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 432 (W. Va. 
1999). 
49
 See, e.g., Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852 (listing “negligent actions of the defendant” as a 
component of the court’s medical monitoring test); Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979 (including 
“exposure . . . caused by the defendant’s negligence” in the elements of a valid medical 
monitoring claim); Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 432 (allowing medical monitoring for exposure 
that results from the defendant’s “tortious conduct”). 
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disease or illness,51 (4) there exist beneficial medical procedures to treat 
that disease or illness,52 and (5) those procedures are reasonably 
necessary.53 
 
[13] One of the biggest differences in the approaches to medical 
monitoring claims is whether recovery depends on the plaintiff having a 
present physical injury.  States with a present-physical-injury requirement 
allow recovery for medical monitoring only when the plaintiff has 
 
                                                                                                                         
50
 Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979.  Some jurisdictions phrase their tests as requiring a 
“significant” increase.  See, e.g., Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852; Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 432. This 
stronger language does not appear to make a substantive difference.  See Bower, 522 
S.E.2d at 432 (holding a “significant” increase in risk does not have to be more probable 
than not, only higher than the risk without exposure). 
51
 Jurisdictions agree that the disease or illness for which the plaintiff is at risk must be 
serious.  See, e.g., Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979 (phrasing this element as requiring a serious 
risk of disease, illness, or injury); Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 432. 
52
 The requirement that the medical procedures be beneficial takes several forms.  
Compare Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852 (requiring the monitoring and testing procedures simply 
be “beneficial”), with Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979 (holding that early detection is beneficial 
if a treatment can alter the course of an illness), and Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 433 (having no 
explicit requirement that the procedure be beneficial, but instead relying on the 
reasonable necessity element to serve the same function). 
53
 Courts have also stated the reasonable necessity requirement in different ways.  Some 
simply say that the medical procedures must be reasonably necessary.  Compare Paoli, 
916 F.2d at 852 (requiring medical examinations to be only reasonably necessary), and 
Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987) (holding that medical 
surveillance must merely be “reasonable and necessary”), with Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979 
(requiring that monitoring be prescribed by a qualified physician according to 
contemporary scientific principles), and Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 433 (explaining that a 
medical procedure is reasonably necessary if a qualified physician would prescribe that 
procedure).  Jurisdictions also differ on whether cost should factor into the analysis.  
Compare Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 433 (holding that “factors such as financial cost and the 
frequency of testing need not necessarily be given significant weight” in determining 
whether a procedure is reasonably necessary) with Hansen, 858 P.2d at 980 (noting that a 
procedure’s costs might outweigh its benefits because “excessive price,” among other 
reasons). 
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manifested some physical harm.54  Of the twenty-nine states that recognize 
medical monitoring claims,55 sixteen allow recovery only when the 
plaintiff has shown a present physical injury.56 
 
2.  BENEFITS 
 
[14] Many of the benefits of allowing medical monitoring claims arise 
from public health interests.  Recognition of medical monitoring claims 
reflects the widely accepted value of early diagnosis and treatment in 
preventing disease,57 and that money alone cannot fully compensate a 
victim for loss of health.58  These public health benefits are some of the 
most commonly cited reasons for allowing medical monitoring claims.59   
 
                                                                                                                         
54
 In some but not all states, the requirement is for a present physical injury—not only 
must there be a demonstrable physical condition traceable to the exposure, but that 
condition must be harmful.  See, e.g., Parker v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 
1355, 1361–62 (N.D. Ga. 2006).  Other states, however, allow medical monitoring when 
there is a physical condition proving exposure, even if that condition is not strictly a 
disease or injury.  See id. (listing several jurisdictions that do and do not consider 
asymptomatic pleural thickening to be an “injury” sufficient to allow recovery of medical 
monitoring costs). 
55 See D. Scott Aberson, Note, A Fifty-State Survey of Medical Monitoring and the 
Approach the Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take when Confronted with the Issue, 32 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1095, 1114–17 (2006). As of 2006, twenty-nine states plus the 
District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands allowed medical monitoring claims.  
See id.  Since then, Mississippi and Oregon have both considered and rejected claims for 
medical monitoring without present physical injuries.  See Paz v. Brush Eng’red 
Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 7 ¶ 20 (Miss. 2007); Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 183 
P.3d 181, 186–87 (Or. 2008). 
56
 Aberson, supra note 55, at 1114. 
57 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311–12. 
58
 See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort 
Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1576 (1997). 
59 See, e.g., Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 33–34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) 
(quoting Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 
824 (Cal. 1993); Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 660 (Ct. App. 1993); 
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[15] Recovery for medical monitoring costs also improves deterrence.60  
Exposure can take decades to develop into disease61—too far in the future 
for potential liability to be a factor when business decisions are often 
based on short-term profits.62  By the time the disease develops, the 
company responsible for the release of toxins might not even be in 
business.63  Not only could payments for medical procedures could happen 
early enough to figure into business calculations, but the shorter time 
frame for medical monitoring claims also allows the plaintiff a better 
chance to prove causation than she would have when the disease is 
diagnosed years or decades after exposure.64 
 
[16] Medical monitoring recovery has been justified on other grounds.  
One consideration is simple equity: when a victim has been exposed to 
toxins as a result of a wrongdoer’s negligence, the wrongdoer, not the 
victim, should shoulder the cost of reasonably necessary medical 
 
                                                                                                                         
Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 976–77 (Utah 1993) (quoting Ayers, 
525 A.2d at 311). 
60
 Potter, 863 P.2d at 824. 
61
 See Miranda, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 659–60 (discussing claims that might be precluded when 
“disease actually develops, years, perhaps decades” into the future); Greenville v. W.R. 
Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that asbestos-related diseases 
“may not develop until decades after exposure”); BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: 
MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 91 (1984) (discussing a 1960 study that found that “[t]he 
average time from onset of exposure to development of cancer was 25 years for lung 
cancer with asbestosis, and 30 years for peritoneal cancer.”). 
62
 M. P. Narayanan, Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results, 40 J. FIN. 1469, 1469 
(1985). 
63
 See Thomas J. Salerno et al., Environmental Law and Its Impact on Bankruptcy Law—
Saga of “Toxins-R-Us”, 25 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 261, 263 (1990); Anthony G. 
Hopp, Bad Medicine: The Legal, Policy and Medical Arguments Against Medical 
Monitoring, 23 BNA TOXICS L. REP. 436, 436–40 (2008). 
64
 Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311–12.  This deterrence function also has a secondary health 
benefit: deterring release and use of toxins reduces the number of infections and thus 
overall public health.  See id. at 312. 
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procedures.65  Another consideration is cost: many diseases that result 
from toxic exposure are expensive to treat; procedures for early detection 
can save money.66 
 
[17] The doctrine of avoidable consequences provides another cost-
related justification. 67  Somewhat incorrectly referred to as a “duty to 
mitigate,” 68 the doctrine prevents a plaintiff from recovering damages she 
could have avoided with reasonable effort.69  A toxic tort plaintiff would 
therefore be unable to recover any amount that was avoidable through 
reasonably necessary detection and prevention procedures.70  Allowing the 
plaintiff to recover the costs of those procedures recognizes that she is 
expected to do so.71 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
65
 See id. at 311. 
66
 See id. at 312; Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993).  
But see discussion infra note 90. 
67
 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 310–11 (noting that under the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences, failure to submit to medically advisable treatment “may bar future 
recovery for a condition he could thereby have alleviated or avoided.”); see also 
discussion infra Part IV.B. 
68
 The doctrine of avoidable consequences is a defense allowing reduction of damages; it 
does not create a duty on the part of the plaintiff to the defendant.  See Jeffrey K. Riffer 
& Elizabeth Barrowman, Recent Misinterpretations of the Avoidable Consequences Rule: 
The “Duty” To Mitigate and Other Fictions, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411, 415–17 
(1993). 
69
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918(1) (1979); see also JACOB A. STEIN, 
STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 18:1 (3d ed. 2009). 
70
 Ayers, 525 A.2d at 310–11.  Note, however, that courts do not always require plaintiffs 
to submit to medical procedures to mitigate damages.  See STEIN, supra note 69 § 18:4. 
71
 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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3.  PROBLEMS 
 
[18] Despite these benefits, medical monitoring claims have several 
problems.  Some of the problems stem from the uncertainty inherent in a 
claim based on monitoring for future harm.72  In most cases, a toxic 
exposure only increases the risk of a future harm; it neither guarantees 
harm nor necessarily creates a significant probability of harm.73   Some 
courts, therefore, find the costs of monitoring to be too speculative to 
convey standing or count as a compensable injury.74  Courts that allow 
medical monitoring claims—especially those that allow claims without a 
showing of present physical injury—reason that the relevant injury is the 
need for monitoring itself, provided that the plaintiff can show that such 
monitoring is medically prudent.75 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
72
 Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997). 
73
 See, e.g., Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Ky. 2002) (noting that 
the plaintiff’s exposure had the “potential to result in serious future medical 
consequences” but had not yet done so). 
74
 See, e.g., id. at 856 (holding that allowing medical monitoring absent a showing of 
present physical injury would enable litigation based on “speculative fears of future 
injury”); Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 830 (Ala. 2001) (holding that “a cause 
of action based upon nothing more than an increased risk that an injury or an illness 
might one day occur would result in the courts of this State deciding cases based upon 
nothing more than speculation and conjecture”). 
75
 See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that “ 
the appropriate inquiry is not whether it is reasonably probable that plaintiffs will suffer 
harm in the future, but rather whether medical monitoring is, to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty, necessary in order to diagnose properly the warning signs of disease.”); 
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993) (emphasizing that 
“allowing compensation for medical monitoring costs ‘does not require courts to 
speculate about the probability of future injury.  It merely requires courts to ascertain the 
probability that the far less costly remedy of medical supervision is appropriate.’”); Ayers 
v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987) (holding that medical monitoring 
damages are available “provided that plaintiffs can establish with a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that such expenditures are ‘reasonably anticipated’ to be incurred by 
reason of their exposure”); Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 430 (W. 
Va. 1999). 
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[19] Similarly, the indeterminate nature of exposure to toxins raises 
serious concerns about the number of potential plaintiffs in a medical 
monitoring case.76  For example, when a polluter releases toxins into the 
environment or when a widely traveled area contains asbestos, it is 
difficult to draw lines between who has been “exposed” and who has not.77  
Critics of medical monitoring point out that nearly everyone is exposed to 
toxins,78 and argue that allowing recovery of medical monitoring costs for 
mere exposure would create a flood of lawsuits that could crush the legal 
system.79  A flood of relatively minor cases would also prevent the courts 
from devoting their limited resources to the most worthy claims.80 
 
[20] The present-physical-injury requirement addresses some of these 
concerns.  An existing physical injury shows the harm necessary for 
 
                                                                                                                         
76
 See Buckley, 521 U.S. at 442. 
77
 See id. (expressing concern that “tens of millions of individuals may have suffered 
exposure to substances that might justify some form of substance-exposure-related 
medical monitoring”). 
78
 See id. at 434–35 (listing statistics showing extensive public exposure to carcinogens); 
see also Susan L. Martin & Jonathan D. Martin, Tort Actions for Medical Monitoring: 
Warranted or Wasteful?, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 121, 130 (1995) (“in the very near 
future we may all have reasonable grounds to allege that some negligent business 
exposed us to hazardous substances.”); Hopp, supra note 63, at 439 (“[i]f negligently 
exposing someone to a hazardous substance gives rise to a legal claim, then every person 
in the United States would daily have a long list of potential lawsuits to choose from.”). 
79
 Buckley, 521 U.S. at 442. See also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, 
Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental 
Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 845 (2002) (“[a]nother 
inescapable implication of the inherent vagueness and open-endedness of medical 
monitoring litigation is that the courts will face, in the long run, an overwhelming flood 
of litigation in this area.”). 
80
 Buckley, 521 U.S. at 443–44 (expressing concern that a medical monitoring cause of 
action would degrade “a tort system that can distinguish between reliable and serious 
claims on the one hand, and unreliable and relatively trivial claims on the other.”). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XVI, Issue 1 
 16
standing and negligence. 81  It also limits the potential class of plaintiffs to 
those who have manifested physical symptoms, eliminating would-be 
plaintiffs who can only allege proximity to a toxin, not infection.82 
 
[21] Another problem with medical monitoring claims is the potential 
risk inherent in medical monitoring procedures.  Many of these procedures 
are invasive and carry health risks that must be weighed against the 
procedures’ potential benefits.83  In addition to the risks from the 
procedures themselves, there are risks that patients may take false 
reassurance from the monitoring, or that false positives could lead to 
unnecessary, costly, or dangerous follow-up procedures.84  A related 
question is whether a toxic exposure really makes monitoring procedures 
more necessary than they would have been otherwise. Some level of 
monitoring is prudent even without any exposure to a toxin;85 it would be 
inequitable to require a defendant to pay for medical procedures the 
plaintiff should have received regardless of exposure.  Juries and judges, 
therefore, face the difficult task of determining the amount of monitoring 
needed as a result of the defendant’s actions over and above the normally 
prudent level.86 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
81
 See, e.g., Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 832 (Ala. 2001); Wood v. Wyeth-
Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Ky. 2002); Paz v. Brush Eng’red Materials, Inc., 949 
So. 2d 1, 9 ¶ 25(Miss. 2007); Aberson, supra note 55, at 1114. 
82
 See Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 690 (Mich. 2005) (explaining that the 
physical injury requirement “defines more clearly who actually possesses a cause of 
action”). 
83
 See Victor E. Schwartz, Leah Lorber & Emily J. Laird, Medical Monitoring: The Right 
Way and the Wrong Way, 70 MO. L. REV. 349, 356–57 (2005) (discussing the risks of 
monitoring procedures). 
84
 Id. 
85
 See Buckley, 521 U.S. at 441–42 (citing expert testimony that the American Cancer 
Society recommends periodic colon cancer screening for everyone). 
86
 See id. (noting the difficulty in getting experts to agree on whether extra monitoring is 
medically necessary as the result of toxic exposure). 
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[22] Courts have addressed these risk and necessity questions by 
relying on expert medical opinions.87  The medical opinions should take 
risk factors into account.88  In theory, a doctor would only prescribe testing 
procedures when the benefits of those procedures outweigh their risks.  
Expert medical testimony can also help establish how much monitoring is 
necessary as a direct result of the alleged exposure.89 
 
[23] Other criticisms of medical monitoring claims involve cost factors.  
Because medical tests can be expensive, courts have expressed concern 
that these procedures could be much more expensive than the illnesses the 
procedures are meant to detect.90  Making defendants pay for the costs of 
medical tests also ignores alternative forms of payment for these 
procedures, such as insurance.91  Some courts and commentators worry 
 
                                                                                                                         
87
 In some jurisdictions, this is satisfied if tests are found to be “reasonably necessary,” 
defined as procedures that a qualified physician would prescribe.  See Bower v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 433 (W. Va. 1999).  Others jurisdictions 
require the actual prescription of the monitoring procedures.  See, e.g., Hansen v. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 980 (Utah 1993).  Hansen’s prescription 
requirement ensures that a medical procedure not only exists and is theoretically 
beneficial, but that a doctor has determined that the procedure is “medically advisable for 
that plaintiff.”  Id. 
88
 The medical necessity of a procedure may or may not involve its monetary cost, 
depending on jurisdiction.  See discussion supra note 53. 
89
 See Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987). 
90
 See, e.g., Buckley, 521 U.S. at 442. In Buckley, the United States Supreme Court noted 
that the plaintiff sought $950 per year in damages for thirty-six years, but that the average 
settlement for asbestos injury claims over a six- year period was $12,500.  Id.  Although 
this may or may not be an accurate cost comparison (Were the damages Buckley sought 
truly representative of the diagnostic costs? Were settlements by the Center for Claims 
Resolution representative, or did they omit high-value claims that went to court?), it 
shows that it is far from certain that monitoring costs will always be less expensive than 
the expected cost of disease, at least in purely monetary terms. 
91
 See id. at 442–43.  Whether toxic tort defendants or insurers are in a better position to 
bear the costs of medical tests is far beyond the scope of this note, but it is worth noting 
that—assuming the tests are medically necessary and will happen either way—the cost of 
those tests is a given, and from a societal standpoint someone will have to pay the cost of 
those tests. The only question is who: the victim, the wrongdoer, or an insurer? 
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about the potentially devastating financial impact medical monitoring 
cases could have on defendants.92  It can also be hard to decide how to 
structure payment of medical monitoring damages; the successful plaintiff 
might not spend a lump sum payment on medical procedures, but an 
award of regular payments would require burdensome judicial 
supervision.93 
 
[24] Finally, medical monitoring damages raise claim preclusion 
issues.94  Claim preclusion prevents a plaintiff from suing a defendant 
twice over the same transaction or occurrence.95  This is a problem when 
medical monitoring costs have been awarded, because a later suit for the 
disease would be based on the same occurrence as the medical monitoring 
suit.96  A strict interpretation of claim preclusion would bar the second 
suit,97 forcing the potential plaintiff to choose between compensation for 
preventive monitoring or compensation for the disease should it develop.98  
 
                                                                                                                         
92
 See, e.g., Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Ky. 2002) (noting that 
requiring defendants to pay large medical monitoring judgments would impair their 
“ability to fully compensate victims who emerge years later with actual injuries that 
require immediate attention.”); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 79, at 844; Hopp, supra 
note 63, at 439. 
93
 See Buckley, 521 U.S. at 440–41 (noting the different ways medical monitoring 
payouts have been handled by courts, and discussing policy concerns about lump-sum 
payments). 
94
 See Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 858–59; see also Tamara Jeanne Dodge, Raging Hormones?: 
The Legal Obstacles and Policy Ramifications to Allowing Medical Monitoring Remedies 
in Hormone Replacement Therapy Suits, 21 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 287–88 (2006). 
95
 Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 858. 
96
 See Dodge, supra note 94, at 287. 
97
 See Wood 82 S.W.3d at 858–59; Christine H. Kim, Note, Piercing the Veil of Toxic 
Ignorance: Judicial Creation of Scientific Research, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 540, 573–74 
(2007). 
98
 See, e.g., Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 659–60 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(allowing medical monitoring costs but refusing to treat them as a distinct cause of action 
and discussing the potential problem this could create for the plaintiff if disease actually 
were to develop).  The decision would be particularly hard because a toxic tort victim 
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Some courts, finding this forced choice to be inequitable, have endorsed 
claim- splitting in medical monitoring cases.99  Because many states have 
rejected medical monitoring damages altogether and not all states that 
allow such claims have had to face the issue, claim preclusion in medical 
monitoring cases remains largely an unsettled question.100 
 
[25] These concerns show why a large number of states have rejected 
medical monitoring as a cause of action, and why many of those that 
recognize medical monitoring claims either require present physical 
symptoms or view medical monitoring costs solely as a measure of 
damages.101  Analysis of medical monitoring claims requires balancing 
conflicting policy benefits and costs; thus, it is an area in which courts are 
split. 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
could be medically better off getting preventive medical procedures but financially better 
off with compensation for the disease.  Id. at 660. 
99
 See Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 300 (N.J. 1987); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. 
Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
100
 See, e.g., Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (finding that 
under Pennsylvania law a claim for medical monitoring damages would not 
“theoretically” preclude a later claim should a disease develop); Pankaj Venugopal, The 
Class Certification of Medical Monitoring Claims, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1659, 1674–78 
(2002) (discussing claim preclusion for medical monitoring claims, and noting that “the 
case law is sparse,” but speculating that courts that allow medical monitoring without 
present physical injury would probably allow later claims for physical injuries).  Some 
authors cite this uncertainty as reason to reject medical monitoring damages altogether.  
See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 94, at 288 (arguing that a court’s position on the claim 
preclusion question is unforeseeable until it has met the issue, and thus it is poor policy to 
allow medical monitoring damages knowing that a claim for later injury might be 
precluded). 
101
 See Dodge, supra note 94, at 287. 
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III.  COMPARING MEDICAL MONITORING CLAIMS TO  
CLAIMS RESULTING FROM DATA LOSS 
 
A.  EXAMINING THE ANALOGY 
 
[26] Data loss shares a number of features with toxic torts.  Both 
involve claims resulting from exposure that may, over time, develop into 
serious and costly harms.102  Whether the plaintiff is exposed to toxins or 
her data is exposed to others, the future harm of the exposure is expected 
to be much worse than any current harm.103  In both cases, causation can 
be difficult to prove because of distance in time between the exposure and 
harm, and because there are multiple possible causes.104  Physical harm is 
not a factor in data loss cases and is not always present in medical 
monitoring cases.105  With both toxins and data loss, procedures may exist 
that can detect or mitigate the progress of the future harm.106 
 
[27] Despite these similarities, several differences exist.  The most 
obvious difference is that toxic tort claims involve physical injury, but 
data loss claims do not.107  Even in toxic tort cases without present 
 
                                                                                                                         
102
 See Vincent R. Johnson, Data Security and Tort Liability, 11 No. 7 J. INTERNET L. 22, 
29–30 (2008). 
103
 See generally Ayers, 525 A.2d 287. 
104
 See id. at 301 (discussing the difficulty of proving causation in toxic tort cases); Erin 
Dowe, Frustration Station: Attempting to Control Your Credit, 16 GEO. MASON U. CIV. 
RTS. L.J. 359, 362–63 (2006) (noting that the remoteness of identity fraud makes 
perpetrators hard to catch); see also discussion supra notes 21, 61. 
105
 See, e.g., Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Ky. 2002) (rejecting a 
medical monitoring claim from a plaintiff who alleged exposure to a drug but no physical 
harm); Ayers, 525 A.2d at 312–13 (allowing medical monitoring damages to plaintiffs 
who were exposed to water contaminated by the defendant, but who had not yet 
developed physical symptoms). 
106
 See Johnson, supra note 102, at 29.  
107
 See id. 
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physical injury, any future harm is medical.108  Despite the stress resulting 
from identity fraud,109 harms from data loss are almost entirely 
economic.110  Because of the important governmental interest in public 
health and the irreversible nature of many illnesses, courts give medical 
harms greater consideration than harms that can be fully repaid with 
money.111  
 
[28] Some differences involve the way future harms develop.  For 
example, the time frames are different: although compromised data may 
not be misused for years, toxins can take decades to develop into 
disease.112  And the reasons for the delayed harm are also different.  Toxins 
take time to develop into disease because they affect the body gradually.113  
But the time between data loss and data misuse is mere delay.  Harm from 
 
                                                                                                                         
108
 See id. 
109
 See Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, 486 F.Supp. 2d 705, 712 (S.D. Ohio 2007) 
(noting “findings that identity theft results in more than purely pecuniary damages, 
including psychological or emotional distress”). 
110
 But see PAM DIXON, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT: THE 
INFORMATION CRIME THAT CAN KILL YOU 5 (2006), 
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/wpf_medicalidtheft2006.pdf. (discussing an 
exception to this general rule: medical identity fraud, where an imposter uses another’s 
identifying information to get medical care).  This form of fraud can be life threatening 
when bad information in a victim’s medical records results in incorrect treatments.  Id. at 
6. 
111
 See Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987). 
112
 See Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that 
asbestos-related diseases “may not develop until decades after exposure”); Miranda v. 
Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 659–60 (Ct. App. 1993) (discussing claims that might 
be precluded when “disease actually develops, years, perhaps decades” into the future); 
CASTLEMAN, supra note 61, at 91. 
113
 Miranda, 26 Cal. Rptr.2d at 659. Indeed, some time delay is usually necessary for a 
toxic exposure to turn into a disease.  Compromised data can be sued as soon as it is 
obtained, and some forms of data (such as credit card numbers) are more useful to the 
thief immediately after being stolen.  See id. 
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data loss also requires an intervening third-party action.114  The data alone 
does no harm until a third party uses it, but toxins produce disease on their 
own.115 
 
[29] There is also a difference in general acceptance of the different 
remedial measures. Doctors, patients, and courts all recognize the 
importance of early diagnosis and treatment of diseases like cancer.116  The 
usefulness of data-loss response measures is far less certain.117  Medical 
tests are also individually prescribed by doctors according to their 
patients’ particular needs.  Credit monitoring, however, is a standardized 
product selected by the consumer without any professional evaluation of 
its usefulness.118 
 
[30] The nature of exposure is also different.  In toxic tort cases, a 
substance is released into the air or water, or is present in an environment 
where people are exposed to it.119  Any number of people could potentially 
find themselves exposed at varying levels.120  Data loss, however, is 
 
                                                                                                                         
114
 See Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F.Supp. 2d 684, 691 (S.D. Ohio 2006).  There is an 
exception to this general rule: a data compromise that makes the data public may create 
privacy issues.  Cf. id.  Imagine, for example, that a photo processing company 
accidentally posts someone’s explicit pictures on the Internet.  In that case, no action of a 
third party was required to create a harm.  But privacy claims for data loss are different 
from the negligence claims contemplated by monitoring claims, and fall outside the scope 
of this note. 
115
 Cf. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 299–300. 
116
 See id. at 311. 
117
 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
118
 See, e.g., How is LifeLock Different From a Credit Monitoring System?, 
http://www.lifelock.com/lifelock-for-people/how-we-do-it/how-is-lifelock-different-
from-a-credit-monitoring-system (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
119
 See, e.g., D. Alan Rudlin & Christopher R. Graham, Toxic Torts: A Primer, 17 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 210, 210 (2003). 
120
 See Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997). 
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comparatively well-defined and binary.  Either a person’s data is among a 
set of lost records or it is not.121   
 
[31] Although it does not pose the same line-drawing problem inherent 
in exposure to toxins, data loss has a similar problem: it is unknown 
whether compromised data will actually be misused.  Thus, some courts 
have imported the “exposure” question into data loss cases by requiring 
plaintiffs to show that their data was either (a) acquired or (b) misused by 
a third party, as opposed to merely lost.122  This requirement is a little like 
the present-physical-injury element some courts require for medical 
monitoring recovery123 and serves a similar purpose of rejecting plaintiffs 
whose injuries are too speculative.124   
 
[32] The analogy is flawed.  But do those flaws weigh in favor of 
accepting data loss monitoring, or against it?  Factors are mixed.  While 
data loss claims obviously lack the compelling public health justification, 
they are less prone to the exposure questions and infinite classes of 
plaintiffs in medical monitoring claims.  The analogy alone is not enough 
to justify allowing or denying data loss monitoring claims.  A full analysis 
 
                                                                                                                         
121
 If the data collector does not know which records were compromised, it should know 
what records it had, or at least all the possible records it had. 
122
 See, e.g., Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Health Care Alliance, 254 Fed. Appx. 664, 666 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (rejecting a claim for credit monitoring, arising out of stolen computer 
equipment, where the plaintiffs “offered no evidence the thieves had any interest in their 
personal information, rather than just the hardware.”); Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, 420 
F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D. Minn. 2006) (rejecting a credit monitoring claim because the 
plaintiffs had not shown that their data was accessed); Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. 
Corp., No. Civ. 05-668 RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 288483, at *6 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006) 
(rejecting a claim where the plaintiff “failed to present evidence that his personal data 
was targeted or accessed” by the people who stole a laptop with the plaintiff’s data). 
123
 See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
124
 See Giordano v. Wachovia Secs., L.L.C., No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036, at *4 (D. 
N.J. July 31, 2006) (holding that the injuries plaintiff claimed were “speculative and 
hypothetical” because she could not show that data lost in the mail had actually been 
misused). 
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must look beyond the analogy and consider the policies behind these 
claims. 
 
B.  MOVING BEYOND THE ANALOGY: POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND  
AGAINST DATA LOSS CLAIMS 
 
[33] Part II.B discussed medical monitoring claims’ benefits and 
problems.  The primary justifications for granting medical monitoring 
claims are interests in public health, deterrence, equity, and cost savings.125  
These claims, however, also suffer a number of problems, including the 
uncertainty of future harm, the difficulty in determining when there has 
been “exposure” absent present physical injury, potential health risks of 
monitoring procedures, the difficulty of determining how much an 
exposure has increased any need for prudent medical testing, the costs of 
monitoring compared to the disease, the cost burden on the defendant, and 
claim preclusion issues.126 
 
[34] Not all of the benefits and problems associated with medical 
monitoring apply in data loss situations.  Most notably, data loss claims 
lack a public health benefit.127  But data loss claims also lack any public 
health danger because data monitoring, unlike many medical monitoring 
procedures, poses no health risk.128  The lack of a public health danger is 
significant.  In some jurisdictions, the lack of physical harm, whether 
immediate or occurring in the future, precludes inquiry into recovery for 
mitigation measures.129  As a consequence, jurisdictions that refuse to 
entertain “novel” tort theories and insist that negligence is available only 
 
                                                                                                                         
125
 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
126
 See discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
127
 See Jennifer A. Chandler, Negligence Liability for Breaches of Data Security, 23 
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 223, 240–41 (2008). 
128
 See discussion supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
129
 See discussion supra Part II.B.1 and accompanying notes. 
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for injury to persons or property are unlikely to look past traditional tort 
principles in consideration of other justifications for data monitoring.130 
 
[35] But there are other justifications for data monitoring claims.  
Remedial measures that allow data loss victims to mitigate the future cost, 
hassle, waste of time, and stress of responding to the misuse of data should 
be available if cost-effective.131  Allowing plaintiffs to recover damages for 
reasonably necessary remedial measures would deter mishandling of data 
and require that the party responsible for losing the data pay the cost of 
those measures.132  The justifications of deterrence, equity, and cost apply 
as much to data loss as they do in cases of physical harm.133  The 
avoidable-consequences justifications may be even stronger in non-
medical cases because the remedial measures do not require the plaintiff to 
submit to potentially dangerous medical procedures.134 
 
[36] Many of the problems with medical monitoring also apply to data 
loss.  These problems often involve determining when remedial measures 
are reasonably necessary.135  The factors used in determining whether 
 
                                                                                                                         
130
 See generally Chandler, supra note 127, at 235–45 (discussing the difficulties 
plaintiffs face in showing actual harm and causation). 
131
 See id. at 229–30, 242. 
132
 2007 GAO Report, supra note 15, at 6. 
133
 See Chandler, supra note 127, at 242.  Note that recovery for plaintiffs must come 
from negligence or strict liability unless a brand new tort cause of action is created.  See 
id. at 230.  Data loss plaintiffs usually lack any contractual privity with data handlers, 
leaving the plaintiffs without contract law remedies.  See id. at 248–50.  Additionally, 
because the United States treats data as property of the data collector, not the data 
subject, the subject has no remedies in property law.  See id.  As to statutory causes of 
action, no statute yet gives a private cause of action for recovering the costs of reasonably 
prudent measures taken in response to data loss.  
134
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. e (1979) (commenting that it may 
not be unreasonable for someone to refuse to undergo medical procedures to avoid loss); 
STEIN, supra note 69 § 18:4.  
135
 See Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987). 
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remedial measures are reasonably necessary include the likelihood of 
future harm, whether a plaintiff (or her data) has been exposed, how much 
of the risk of future harm comes from the exposure instead of from other 
sources, and the cost-effectiveness of remedial measures.136  Courts 
denying credit monitoring have implicitly recognized these factors in 
cases where plaintiffs failed to show that credit monitoring was reasonably 
necessary.137   
 
[37] Although data monitoring, like medical monitoring, may impose a 
heavy burden on defendants, data monitoring is essentially a loss-
prevention measure.  If monitoring is effective, the defendant pays less for 
the monitoring then it would have paid to compensate future loss.138  
 
                                                                                                                         
136
 See discussion, infra note 137. 
137
 See, e.g., Melancon v. La. Office of Student Fin. Assistance, 567 F. Supp. 2d 873, 877 
(E.D. La. 2008) (finding no cognizable losses from lost backup tapes where no evidence 
was offered that any data on those tapes was accessed); Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, 
LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712–13 (S.D. Ohio 2007)  (rejecting claims by a plaintiff who 
sought the cost of credit monitoring after hard drives were stolen, but could not show that 
the data on those hard drives was the target of theft, and where there was no evidence that 
any unauthorized person was able to access the data on those drives); Forbes v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021, 1021 n.3 (D. Minn. 2006) (rejecting 
credit monitoring damages based on a stolen laptop computer because the plaintiffs had 
not shown a present or “reasonably certain” future injury or any intent to misuse their lost 
information); Giordano v. Wachovia Secs., L.L.C., No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036, at *4 
(D. N.J. July 31, 2006) (rejecting a claim for credit monitoring after a printout containing 
the plaintiff’s social security number was lost in the mail).  In each of these cases, there 
was no evidence that a third party had accessed the lost data.  Lost laptop and lost media 
cases in particular seem doomed to failure.  But see Ponder v. Pfizer, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 
2d 793 (M.D. La. 2007).  In Ponder, there was evidence that personal information of 
17,000 current and former Pfizer employees was actually accessed and downloaded off of 
an employee’s laptop computer.  Id. at 794.  The court still rejected the claim for credit 
monitoring because that data had not been misused and because there had been no 
physical injury. Id. at 796–98.   
138
 See Johnson, supra note 102, at 29.  If data handlers would save money by paying for 
paying for monitoring costs instead of waiting and paying for latent harms, why would 
they ever avoid paying for monitoring?  Presumably, one does not have to resort to legal 
remedies to persuade companies to save money. Indeed, companies are already paying 
for a limited amount of monitoring in the form of free credit monitoring to data breach 
victims.  See 2007 GAO Report, supra note 15 at 35.  But there are reasons an 
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Furthermore, the burden of data monitoring on the defendant is limited 
because the class of potential data monitoring plaintiffs consists only of 
those whose data was mishandled.139  For example, if an intruder were to 
access a company’s database of one thousand customers, only those one 
thousand customers could have claims.  A data handler could therefore 
prospectively limit its exposure to litigation not only by handling data 
carefully, but also by limiting the number of people about whom it collects 
data.140  The burden on data handlers could be further reduced by requiring 
plaintiffs to allege actual disclosure to a third party (as opposed to mere 
loss) and by requiring proof that the remedial measures are reasonably 
necessary.141 
 
[38] Claim preclusion is an issue for both data loss claims and medical 
monitoring claims, requiring potential plaintiffs to choose whether to seek 
immediate recovery for remedial measures or wait and preserve a claim 
for a later loss.142  Although the choice would be difficult, it is at least a 
choice the data loss victim otherwise would not have had.  One author has 
suggested making this tradeoff explicit by limiting the liability of breached 
organizations to the cost of reasonably necessary steps to prevent identity 
 
                                                                                                                         
organization might not voluntarily pay for extended monitoring, even when it would save 
money.  Organizations cannot predict the future, so do not know when present 
monitoring would be less expensive than latent harms.  They might also prefer to risk 
possible future lawsuits rather than make definite payments in the present—especially if 
those potential lawsuits are far enough in the future that plaintiffs would have trouble 
proving causation.  See Chandler, supra note 127, at 235–38 (discussing the difficulties 
plaintiffs face in proving causation in data fraud cases). 
139
 See Chandler, supra note 127, at 242. 
140
 See id. 
141
 Stollenwerk v. Tri-W. Health Care Alliance, 254 Fed. Appx. 664, 666 (9th Cir. 2007); 
see Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987).; Johnson, supra note 102, 
at 29. 
142
 See Chandler, supra note 127, at 238–44. 
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fraud.143   But such a liability cap would only make sense if these measures 
were actually effective. 
 
IV.  CRITERIA FOR AWARDING NON-MEDICAL MONITORING DAMAGES 
 
A.  AWARDING DAMAGES BASED ON REASONABLE NECESSITY 
 
[39] Even though the analogy between medical monitoring and data 
monitoring is flawed, non-medical monitoring may still be justified in 
certain cases.  Adapting the criteria used in medical monitoring cases to 
non-medical situations gives a similar test.144  A plaintiff should be 
allowed recovery when (1) there is a precipitating event, (2) that event 
resulted from the defendant’s negligence, (3) the event increased the 
plaintiff’s risk of future harm, (4) there exist preventive remedial 
measures, and (5) those measures are reasonably necessary.145   
 
[40] This model relies on standard negligence theory.  It does not create 
a new cause of action, but instead recognizes reasonably necessary costs 
as a measure of negligence damages and, therefore, requires proof for all 
standard elements of negligence, including cause-in-fact and proximate 
cause.146  The model also requires that the plaintiff not only have a risk of 
future harm, but an increased risk, and that the increase have been caused 
by the breach.147 
 
                                                                                                                         
143
 See Johnson, supra note 102, at 29–30. 
144
 See discussion supra Part II.B.1 and accompanying notes. 
145
 Cf. Schwartz, supra note 83, at 356–57.  Put in data breach terms, this would require 
that (1) the plaintiff’s data was exposed in a breach; (2) the defendant negligently caused 
that breach; (3) the data breach created an increased risk that the plaintiff will suffer 
future fraud or other harm; (4) a way exists to reduce or eliminate that risk, and (5) the 
defendant’s negligence made those measures reasonably necessary.  See discussion supra 
Part II.B.1 and accompanying notes. 
146
 See Chandler, supra note 127, at 235–45 (discussing how courts have historically 
found against plaintiffs in data loss cases because of a failure to show actual harm or 
causation). 
147
 See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
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[41] The central feature of this model is that it allows recovery for 
remedial measures that are reasonably necessary.  This reflects the 
approach followed in Ayers, which allowed costs reasonably incurred by 
the plaintiff as legitimate measures of harm stemming from a defendant’s 
actions.148  The model also recognizes that under the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences, plaintiffs are expected to take reasonably necessary 
remedial measures.149 
 
[42] But when are remedial measures reasonably necessary?  One 
approach would be to apply the same reasonable person standard that is 
usually employed in determining what is objectively “reasonable.”150  This 
is the approach of the avoidable consequences doctrine, and a first and 
necessary step to keep the model in conformity with existing tests.151  But 
a test for the reasonable necessity of remedial measures should go beyond 
a mere reasonable-person inquiry.  Certain situations may increase 
confidence that data monitoring costs are reasonably necessary.152  For 
example, remedial measures may be more likely to be reasonably 
necessary when the plaintiff’s data was actually exposed to a third-party, 
creating an increased risk that the plaintiff will suffer future fraud.  
Remedial measures might also be considered more likely to be necessary 
when those measures are cost-effective in the aggregate—i.e., when the 
expected total costs of the breach when remedial measures are used are 
much lower than the expected costs without remedial measures.153 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
148
 See Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987). 
149
 See discussion infra Part IV.B and accompanying notes. 
150
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. c (“[t]he factors determining 
whether an injured person has used care to avert the consequences of a tort are in general 
the same as those that determine whether a person has been guilty of negligent conduct”). 
151
 See id.; STEIN, supra note 69, § 18:1. 
152
 See STEIN, supra note 69, § 18:1. 
153
 See discussion supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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[43] A federal district court in New York suggested some possible 
minimum criteria for establishing “exposure” of data.154  Trying to apply 
New York law in an area where New York had not yet spoken, the court 
held that New York would likely require a plaintiff to show a 
“demonstrable basis for a serious concern over misuse” of data on a lost 
laptop.155  The court listed several factors that might be used to show such 
a basis: (1) lack of password protection, (2) intent and ability by the laptop 
thief to access the data, or (3) actual misuse of information that was on the 
hard drive.156 
 
[44] The reasonable necessity model is consistent with cases that have 
both allowed157 and  rejected medical monitoring claims.158  In Stollenwerk, 
for example, the court rejected the plaintiff’s claim because she had not 
 
                                                                                                                         
154
 See Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281–82 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
155 
 Id. 
156
 Id.  The misused information would not have to be the plaintiff’s information; concern 
over misuse could also be established by showing that someone else’s data from the same 
stolen hard drive had been misused.  See id. 
157
 See Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987) (noting that it would be 
inequitable to force someone wrongfully exposed to toxic chemicals “to have to pay his 
own expenses when medical intervention is clearly reasonable and necessary.”). 
158
 One of the exceptions seems to be the result of confusion on the part of the court.  See 
generally Giordano v. Wachovia Secs., L.L.C., No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036 (D. N.J. 
July 31, 2006).  The court in Giordano rejected an analogy between credit monitoring 
and medical monitoring because the latter requires an actual exposure to a toxin, not a 
mere potential exposure.  Id. at *3 n.4.  It held that because the plaintiff had merely 
alleged potential identity fraud, not actual fraud, she had not shown “exposure.”  Id.  This 
analysis misinterprets the analogy. Identity theft was the future harm that credit 
monitoring was meant to prevent.  Asking the plaintiff to show actual fraud before 
seeking credit monitoring is like asking someone exposed to asbestos to prove that she 
has cancer before allowing her to seek the cost of tests to detect cancer.  A more 
appropriate analysis would have required the plaintiff to show that the data breach 
actually exposed her data to a third party. 
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shown that credit monitoring was reasonably necessary.159 The model’s 
requirement that a plaintiff show data exposure also fits several cases that 
refused to allow credit monitoring for lack of data misuse.160  Of course, 
not all courts would follow the model, especially those that require present 
physical harm for medical monitoring claims or those that do not allow 
negligence recovery for economic harms.  But for those courts willing to 
look to non-physical forms of negligence harm, the reasonable necessity 
model fits. 
 
B.  STANDING AND THE DOCTRINE OF AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES 
 
[45] The doctrine of avoidable consequences provides another reason to 
allow recovery of the costs of reasonably necessary remedial measures. 
The doctrine holds that a tort plaintiff may not recover damages for any 
harm she could reasonably have avoided.161  This doctrine, however, may 
 
                                                                                                                         
159
 Stollenwerk v. Tri-W. Health Care Alliance, 254 F. Appx 664, 666–67 (9th Cir. 2007).  
The court held that the plaintiff had made “no showing that a normally prudent person in 
these circumstances” would have obtained “premium credit monitoring,” and that the 
plaintiff’s expert testimony was “entirely too conclusory to establish that a reasonable 
person faced with Stollenwerk’s level of risk of identity theft would incur significant 
monitoring costs.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
160
 See, e.g., Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281–
82 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting a claim for credit monitoring where the plaintiff could not 
show that there was a “rational basis” to believe that data on a stolen laptop would be 
misused); Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 710–11 (S.D. Ohio 
2007) (rejecting credit monitoring where there was no evidence that information from a 
stolen hard drive had been accessed by unauthorized individuals or that it would be used 
for unlawful purposes if accessed); see also discussion supra note 137. 
161
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1979).  The standard of behavior for 
the avoidable consequences doctrine is the same as for negligence: reasonable behavior 
under all the circumstances.  Id. § 918 cmt. c; see also STEIN, supra note 69 § 18:4.  The 
plaintiff is not required to calculate all the probabilities nor is he “bound at his or her 
peril to know the best thing to do.”  Id. § 18:1.  But the likelihood that remedial measures 
will be successful is a factor in considering whether a plaintiff is expected to take 
remedial measures.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. e. 
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conflict with the constitutional requirement of standing.162  The tension 
arises when inexpensive remedial measures may prevent large, unlikely 
losses.  For example, suppose one could spend $100 to avoid a one percent 
chance of losing $1,000,000.  Spending the $100 would be rational.  The 
expected loss from a one percent chance of losing $1,000,000 is 
$10,000—one hundred times the cost of avoiding the loss.163  But a court 
may say that a one-percent probability of loss is too unlikely to establish 
standing, regardless of the amount of potential loss. 
 
[46] In monitoring cases, the doctrines of avoidable consequences and 
standing have conflicting goals.  The doctrine of avoidable consequences 
reflects the importance of taking reasonable measures to avoid loss; the 
amount of potential loss figures into the reasonableness analysis.164  But 
standing is meant to bar speculative claims–it depends on how likely a loss 
is, not the potential size of the loss.165  The result in cases with a small 
probability of a large loss is that the plaintiff is left without recovery.  The 
avoidable consequences doctrine prevents a plaintiff from recovering the 
million-dollar loss that could reasonably have been mitigated, but lack of 
standing bars any claims for the mitigation.166   
 
 
                                                                                                                         
162
 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 310–11 (noting that under the avoidable consequences rule, a 
plaintiff “is required to submit to treatment that is medically advisable; failure to do so 
may bar future recovery for a condition he could thereby have alleviated or avoided.”); 
see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (discussing the 
required showings to establish standing). 
163
 People make reasonable decisions that do not necessarily match this simple example 
of a rational choice, so a reasonable person might not actually make this choice 
depending on that person’s preferences, risk tolerance, and other factors. See generally 
Bruce Chapman, The Rational and The Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and 
Adjudication, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 41 (1994). 
164
 See STEIN, supra note 69 § 18:1 (noting that the doctrine of avoidable consequences is 
applied based on what is “reasonable under all of the circumstances.”). 
165
 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (reiterating that constitutional standing requires an injury 
that is likely, not speculative). 
166
 See Chapman, supra note 163, 88–89; STEIN, supra note 69, § 18:1. 
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[47] The key to resolving this conflict lies in understanding the harm in 
monitoring cases.  Many courts that have found a lack of standing have 
focused on the likelihood of eventual loss–the one percent probability.167  
But when remedial measures are reasonably necessary, the harm is the 
necessity of expenses the plaintiff would not otherwise have incurred, not 
whatever future injury would have resulted had the measures not been 
taken.168  A reasonable-necessity standard recognizes standing to seek 
compensation for those plaintiffs that have taken the remedial measures 
the doctrine of avoidable consequences expects.169 
 
C.  COST ANALYSIS OF REMEDIAL MEASURES FOR LATENT HARM 
 
[48] Recovery for post-breach remedial measures is likely to be 
reasonably necessary only if the measures save money—if recovery for 
these measures would be less expensive than waiting for the latent harm to 
mature.170  One way to determine this is by comparing the estimated 
expected costs of a data breach with and without remedial measures.  If 
the expected cost of a data breach with remedial measures is significantly 
lower than the expected cost without them, those measures could be 
considered reasonably necessary.  Conversely, if the expected costs do not 
significantly decline when remedial measures are taken, it is unlikely that 
those measures would be found to be reasonably necessary.171 
 
                                                                                                                         
167
 See discussion supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
168
 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d Cir. 1990) (“the appropriate 
inquiry is not whether it is reasonably probable that plaintiffs will suffer harm in the 
future, but rather whether medical monitoring is, to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, necessary in order to diagnose properly the warning signs of disease.”). 
169
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. b (1979) (noting that when a 
plaintiff has failed to make substantial efforts to avert the consequences of a tort, 
damages are reduced to the amount of the expense that plaintiff should have taken). 
170
 See id. § 918 cmt. h. 
171
 Note that this simple comparison does not account for the cost to the system of 
litigating claims.  Litigation would probably increase or become more complex with the 
field of potential plaintiffs opened to those who incurred reasonably necessary 
monitoring expenses.  For remedial measures to be reasonably necessary, their cost 
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[49] The expected cost of latent harm without remedial measures for an 
individual victim is determined by the increase in probability of loss 
attributable to the event multiplied by the amount of that victim’s loss.172  
Assuming a uniform probability of loss,173 the total expected cost of a 
latent harm for all victims is equal to the product of (a) the increase in 
probability of loss attributable to the event, (b) the average loss, and (c) 
the number of victims affected.174   
 
[50] The expected cost with remedial measures is slightly more 
complicated than the expected cost without them.  In addition to the cost 
of the measures themselves, the calculation must include the cost of latent 
harms that still occur despite the remedial measures, independent of 
whether or not the plaintiffs can recover these latent harms.175  The 
calculation must also include the risk that the remedial measures might do 
harm of their own.  Thus, the expected cost of remedial measures is the 
sum of (a) the cost of the measures themselves, (b) the cost of residual 
latent harm, and (c) the risk of additional harm from the remedial 
measures themselves.  
 
                                                                                                                         
therefore should be significantly lower than the cost without them—i.e., anything near a 
break-even comparison should default to disallowing the remedial measures. 
172
 See Philippe Mongin, Expected Utility Theory, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC 
METHODOLOGY 171 (John B. Davis, D. Wade Hands & Uskali Mäki ed., Edward Elgar 
Publishing 1998). 
173
 A uniform probability of loss would mean that each breach victim has the same 
probability of latent harm as each other victim. 
174
 The appropriate calculation is the expected cost for all victims because this more fully 
reflects the societal costs of a breach as well as the potential cost to a breached 
organization. 
175
 When remedial measures are not one hundred percent effective at preventing the latent 
harm, some of that latent harm happens anyway.  For example, assume a remedial 
measure successfully reduces the eventual loss by fifty percent.  The total expected cost 
is the cost of providing remedial measures to all the victims, plus the fifty percent 
residual latent harm.  To put this into numbers, suppose the cost of remedial measures is 
$100 per victim, the latent harm is $10,000 per victim, and the remedial measures are 
50% effective with no harmful side effects.  The expected cost per victim is $100 + 
0.50($10,000) = $5100. 
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V.  APPLYING THE REASONABLE NECESSITY MODEL TO  
DATA BREACHES 
 
[51] As previously discussed, remedial measures are cost-effective 
when the aggregate expected loss with remedial measures is substantially 
lower than the aggregate expected loss without those measures.176  The 
expected loss from identity fraud resulting from a data breach depends on 
three variables: the cost of identity fraud, the cost and effectiveness of 
measures designed to prevent or mitigate identity fraud, and the 
probability that a data breach will lead to identity fraud.177  The remainder 
of this article uses available information on data breach and identity fraud 
to estimate whether data monitoring options are cost-effective and, thus, 
potentially reasonably necessary.178 
 
A.  COST OF IDENTITY FRAUD 
 
[52] How much does identity fraud cost?  It is a simple question with a 
complex answer.  The total cost of identity fraud depends on the answers 
to other questions.  Does “cost” include time and effort spent responding 
to a fraud, or only financial loss?  Is the measure of “cost” the out-of-
pocket expense to the identity fraud victim, the value of goods stolen, or 
overall systematic cost?  The cost of identity fraud also depends on the 
type of fraud.  The harms, and therefore, the costs, differ depending on 
 
                                                                                                                         
176
 See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
177
 See id. 
178
 As discussed more fully below, much of the available data is contradictory or of 
suspect quality.  In some cases the only redeeming feature is that the data is (probably) 
better than nothing.  All is not lost, however.  Evaluating the viability of data monitoring 
damages only requires determining whether the expected cost of a breach with remedial 
measures is substantially greater than the expected cost without them.  If the inequality is 
so substantial that any margin of error in the data is irrelevant, that is still a useful result.  
Precision only matters if the inequality is close—which would not clearly establish the 
substantial economic benefit required to show reasonable necessity. In short, even with 
faulty data, any result other than one that overwhelmingly shows cost-effectiveness 
argues against allowing data monitoring claims. 
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whether the fraud is on a new account, existing account, or is non-
financial. 
 
[53] Experts generally distinguish between three forms of identity 
fraud: new account fraud, existing account fraud, and non-financial 
fraud.179  New account fraud happens when someone uses a victim’s 
personal information to create a new account, such as a loan, in the 
victim’s name.180  Existing account fraud occurs when one of a victim’s 
accounts, such as a credit card or checking account, is used without 
authorization.181  Non-financial fraud can result from other uses of 
someone’s identity, such as medical identity fraud, where someone gives 
false information to get medical care; criminal identity fraud, where a 
suspect or arrestee impersonates someone else; or employment identity 
 
                                                                                                                         
179
 See, e.g., SYNOVATE, FED. TRADE COMM’N: 2006 IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 
12 (2007), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/11/SynovateFinalReportIDTheft2006.pdf 
[hereinafter 2006 FTC Survey]; Schreft, supra note 12, at 7; Towle, supra note 12, at 
242–47. 
180 See, e.g., 2007 GAO Report, supra note 15, at 2. 
181
 See id. Some sources refer to this as “account takeover” or “account hijacking.” See, 
e.g., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., PUTTING AN END TO ACCOUNT-HIJACKING IDENTITY 
THEFT 4–6 (2004), www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/idtheftstudy/identity_theft.pdf. A 
few experts further distinguish between credit-card fraud and other forms of existing 
account fraud. See Katrina Baum, Identity Theft, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, Nov. 2007, at 1, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/it05.pdf [hereinafter 2005 BJS Survey]. Federal 
law limits consumer liability for unauthorized credit and debit card use. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1643(a)(1)(B), 1693(g)(a) (2006); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.12(b), 205.6(b) (2009). Visa and 
MasterCard have also instituted zero-liability policies, further reducing consumer liability 
for credit card fraud. See Douglas Akers et al., Overview of Recent Developments in the 
Credit Card Industry, 17 No. 3 FDIC BANKING REV. 23, 32 n.46 (2005), available at 
www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2005nov/article2.pdf. These laws and policies 
make credit card fraud a very low-cost form of fraud for the consumer, and some studies 
therefore distinguish it from other forms of existing-account fraud. 
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fraud, where the perpetrator uses someone else’s identity to gain 
employment.182 
 
[54] Several studies have attempted to measure identity fraud costs.183  
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) began collecting consumer identity 
fraud complaints in 1999,184 and has published reports on its data since 
2000.185  It also commissioned surveys in 2003186 and 2007.187  The Bureau 
of Justice Statistics of the Department of Justice (BJS) has also surveyed 
identity fraud victims.188  Non-government surveys include those by the 
 
                                                                                                                         
182
 See Jim Collins, Identity Theft: The Pros and Cons of Identity Scoring vs. Credit 
Monitoring, YOUNG MONEY, July 8, 2008, 
http://www.youngmoney.com/credit_reports/281. 
183
 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT COMPLAINT 
DATA, JAN.–DEC. 2007 (2008), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/02/fraud.pdf [hereinafter 
2008 FTC Complaint Data]; IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., IDENTITY THEFT: THE 
AFTERMATH 2007 (2008), 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/Aftermath_2007_20080529v2_1.pdf 
[hereinafter 2007 ITRC Survey]; JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, 2009 IDENTITY 
FRAUD SURVEY REPORT: CONSUMER VERSION (2009), 
http://www.idsafety.net/901.R_IdentityFraudSurveyConsumerReport.pdf [hereinafter 
2009 Javelin Survey]; 2005 BJS Survey, supra note 181; CTR. FOR IDENTITY MGMT. & 
INFO. PROT., IDENTITY FRAUD TRENDS AND PATTERNS: BUILDING A DATA-BASED 
FOUNDATION FOR PROACTIVE ENFORCEMENT (2007), 
http://www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/ecil/publications/media/cimip_id_theft_study_o
ct22_noon.pdf  [hereinafter 2007 CIMIP Report]; 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179. 
184
 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTITY THEFT PROGRAM (2003), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/timelinereport.pdf. 
185
 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, NATIONAL DATA, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/reference-desk/national-data.html (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
186
 See generally 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179. 
187
 See id. 
188
 See generally 2005 BJS Survey, supra note 181. 
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Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC)189 and Javelin Strategy & 
Research.190   
 
[55] These studies vary widely in their methodologies.191  
Unsurprisingly, they also vary widely in their results.  The Javelin and 
 
                                                                                                                         
189
 See 2007 ITRC Survey, supra note 183. 
190
 See 2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183; JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, 
SYNDICATED REPORT BROCHURE, 2009 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY REPORT: IDENTITY 
FRAUD ON THE RISE, BUT COSTS PLUMMET AS PROTECTIONS INCREASE (2009), 
http://www.javelinstrategy.com/uploads/901.R_IdentityFraudSurveyBrochure.pdf; see 
also BBBOnline.org, New Research Shows Identity Fraud Growth is Contained and 
Consumers Have More Control than they Think, 
http://www.bbbonline.org/IDtheft/safetyQuiz.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). Javelin’s 
optimism might be related to the fact that it is also consults for the financial services 
industry. See Eve Mitchell, ID Theft Poses a Bigger Risk Offline, PITTS. POST-GAZETTE, 
June 10, 2008, at A6, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/08162/888660-
28.stm; Javelin Strategy & Research, Clients, 
http://www.javelinstrategy.com/about/portfolio (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
191
 The 2006 FTC survey used random-digit-dialing phone interviews of 4917 people. 
2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at 3. Its statistics were based on the 559 people who 
reported “discovering the misuse of their personal information” since 2001. Id. at 17 n.4. 
The ITRC, by contrast, e-mailed its survey to 1031 identity fraud victims who had 
contacted the ITRC in the previous year. 2007 ITRC Survey, supra note 183, at 36. It 
received responses from 117 victims. Id. The ITRC claims a fourteen percent “response 
rate,” based on the 817 people who it believed actually received a survey after 214 e-
mails were returned as undeliverable. Id. This is more accurately termed a cooperation 
rate. See Am. Ass’n for Public Opinion Research, Standard Definitions: Final 
Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys (2008), 
http://www.aapor.org/content/NavigationMenu/ResourcesforResearchers/StandardDefinit
ions/Standard_Definitions_07_08_Final.pdf. Note that the respondents in the ITRC 
survey self-selected twice: once in contacting the ITRC in the first place, and again in 
choosing to respond to the survey. See 2007 ITRC Survey, supra note 183, at 36. The 
Javelin study also used phone surveys, contacting 4,784 respondents, 482 of whom said 
they were identity fraud victims. 2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 18. The FTC’s 
consumer complaint data was based on actual self-reported and unverified consumer 
complaints, not a survey. 2008 FTC Complaint Data, supra note 183, at 2. The BJS 
included identity fraud questions as a supplement to its National Crime Victimization 
Survey, which is conducted by the Census Bureau and surveys about 76,000 people. See 
2005 BJS Survey, supra note 181, at 6; Michael Rand & Shannan Catalano, Criminal 
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ITRC surveys both reported measures of average192 out-of-pocket193 
losses.194  Javelin’s survey found that fraud victims lost “almost $500” 
over all forms of identity fraud.195  The ITRC reported average losses of 
$550 per victim for existing-account frauds and $1865 for new-account 
frauds.196  All four surveys also reported total-loss197 figures: $1620 
(BJS),198 $1882 (FTC),199 $5555 (Javelin),200 and $48,941.11 (ITRC)201 per 
 
                                                                                                                         
Victimization, 2006, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, December 2007, at 7, 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv06.pdf. 
192
 Although median values more accurately represent the typical identity fraud victim’s 
experience, average (mean) values are more relevant to the calculation of aggregate 
expected losses because of the relationship between averages and totals. But they are also 
more easily influenced by small numbers of outlier responses. 
193
 Out-of-pocket losses include only unreimbursed expenses incurred by identity fraud 
victims.  Goods and services that are stolen but which that the identity theft victim does 
not eventually pay for would not be included in out-of- pocket losses. 
194
 See 2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 5, 20; 2007 ITRC Survey, supra note 183, 
at 3. 
195
 2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 5. 
196
 2007 ITRC Survey, supra note 183, at 17.  The $1865 figure for new-account fraud 
was based on the responses of only forty-five people; ITRC did not reveal the number of 
people whose responses formed the basis of the $550 figure for existing accounts.  Id.; 
see also discussion supra note 191 (noting the methodological flaws with the ITRC 
Survey). 
197
 Total losses include the total value of goods and services stolen, not only victims’ out-
of-pocket expenses. 
198
 2005 BJS Survey, supra note 181, at 5.  This number reflects a survey question that 
asked for the total dollar amount obtained (“[w]hat was the total dollar amount of the 
credit, loans, cash, services, and anything else the person obtained while misusing (the 
credit card account(s)/any existing accounts other than credit cards/personal information 
or new account(s))?”).  Id. at 7. 
199
 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at 8.  The FTC survey also reported detailed 
median and percentile data broken down by identity fraud type (identifying as new 
account, existing account, and credit-card only), but only reported overall means.  Id. at 
5–8.  The survey reported median out-of-pocket costs of $0 for existing-account fraud, 
and $40 for new account fraud.  Id. at 5. 
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victim.  The BJS survey further categorized total losses by type of fraud, 
reporting averages of $4850 for new-account frauds, $980 for existing-
credit-card frauds, and $1220 for other existing-account frauds.202 
 
[56] The surveys also varied widely in the amounts reportedly lost by 
victims.  A survey of cases handled by the U.S. Secret Service reported 
actual loss figures that ranged from no loss in thirty-four cases to a 
thirteen-million dollar loss in one case.203  The same survey reported that 
eighteen percent of defendants ordered to pay restitution were required to 
pay more than $100,000.204  These numbers show how a few very high-
 
                                                                                                                         
200
 See JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, 2008 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY REPORT: 
CONSUMER VERSION 4 (2008), 
www.idsafety.net/803.R_2008%20Identity%20Fraud%20Survey%20Report_Consumer
%20Version.pdf.  The publicly available version of Javelin’s 2008 survey did not report 
an average, but said that 8.1 million people were victimized by identity fraud for a total 
of $45 billion, equivalent to a $5555.00 average per-person loss.  Note, however, that this 
is a per-person estimate, not a per-incident estimate, and does not factor in the possibility 
that the 8.1 million person figure includes each member of families (i.e., so that a family 
of four suffering one fraud incident would count as four people, not one incident).  See id. 
201
 2007 ITRC Survey, supra note 183, at 18.  This number reflects a $48,941.11 cost to 
businesses (survey respondents were asked “to total the charges on the fraudulent 
accounts in their name . . . based on how much money victims were billed by creditors, 
banks, and collection agencies, as well as other related costs”).  Id.  Note, however, that 
this number is based on the responses of only forty-eight people, and does not exclude six 
outliers who reported between $100,000 and $700,000 in total losses.  Id.; see also 
discussion supra note 191 on the ITRC survey’s methodological flaws. 
202
 2005 BJS Survey, supra note 181, at 5.  The BJS survey categorized frauds as 
involving the “unauthorized use or attempted use of existing credit cards,” “other existing 
accounts,” or “personal information.”  Id.  Because misuse of personal information is 
most closely associated with new-account fraud, the BJS results for “personal 
information” are included with new-account fraud data in this note.  See id. 
203
 2007 CIMIP Report, supra note 183, at 26–27. 
204
 Id. at 25. 
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value cases skew the overall averages.205  The averages should, therefore, 
be considered very rough figures at best. 
 
[57] What, then, is the cost of identity fraud?  The answer is somewhere 
between “it depends” and “answer hazy, ask again later.”  Even within a 
particular type of fraud and measure of loss, different surveys—some with 
significant methodological flaws—give widely different results.  For the 
purposes of analyzing data monitoring cost effectiveness, the best that can 
be done is to work with the numbers that are available while recognizing 
their problems.  
 
B.  PROBABILITY THAT A DATA BREACH WILL LEAD TO  
IDENTITY FRAUD 
 
[58] If the cost of identity fraud is a complicated question, the 
probability that a data breach will lead to identity fraud is downright 
inscrutable.  No study measures this probability.206  A rudimentary 
calculation of the probability that a data breach will lead to identity fraud 
could be done by dividing (a) the number of identity fraud cases caused by 
data breach by (b) the total number of fraud-enabling records exposed in 
data breaches.207  A proper calculation is not that simple, but even that 
level of estimation is difficult to do because the necessary data is flawed.208 
 
                                                                                                                         
205
 This does not imply that an arithmetic mean is the wrong measure for evaluating cost 
effectiveness of remedial measures.  Aggregate cost savings depends on reducing total 
amount of losses, not on reducing losses for the most people.  But these numbers do show 
how a few very costly fraud cases can dramatically shift an average. 
206
 Estimates have been done for the rate of credit card misuse, but not for identity fraud 
more broadly.  See, e.g., Thomas M. Lenard & Paul H. Rubin, Much Ado About 
Notification, REGULATION, Spring 2006, at 44, 47. 
207
 “Fraud-enabling” records would be records that contain data that can be used to 
perpetrate identity fraud. 
208
 One complication involves time frames.  What time period of data breaches and what 
time period of identity fraud cases should one compare?  Data breaches release data that 
may be used years later for fraud, so simply comparing a year’s worth of data breaches to 
the same year’s number of identity frauds compares unrelated numbers.  Data breaches 
are also reported according the year the breach was discovered, but a few breaches occur 
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[59] Part of the problem is that the different parts of the calculation are 
tracked using different units of measure, making direct comparison 
difficult.  Identity fraud figures count people or households, but data 
breach statistics are tracked by number of records.209  The number of 
records compromised in a data breach may not be the same as the number 
of people involved.  For example, although a record may be a customer, it 
could also be a transaction or a credit card entry.  Even if each record is a 
person, a database could have multiple entries for the same person.210  
Finally, some people may have been affected by multiple breaches; simply 
adding all records in all breach events would count these people multiple 
times. 
 
[60] Another problem is data incompleteness.  Many organizations have 
carefully studied the causes, sources, and amount of identity fraud,211 but 
data breach numbers are far less certain.  Most breach numbers are known 
only because state data breach notification laws require organizations to 
 
                                                                                                                         
over a long time before they are discovered.  For example, hackers were able to steal 
credit card numbers from TJX over a seventeen-month period.  See Mark Jewell, Security 
Breach at TJX Believed to be Biggest Ever, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 22, 2007, at 
1E.  The forty five million records affected are usually all counted for 2007, the year the 
problem was discovered.  See, e.g., Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data 
Breaches, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 
2009) (including TJX in the list of 2007 data breaches).  A year-by-year comparison also 
assumes that compromised data is either used for fraud or discarded at about the same 
rate as breached data becomes available.  But another possibility exists: that breached 
data is accumulated in bulk then used over a period of time, like a windfall profit spent 
gradually.  Such a pattern would require knowing not just the amount of compromised 
fraud-enabling data and the number of identity fraud over a seventeen-month period.  Cf. 
Jewell, supra.  This is not an easy problem. 
209
 See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 208.  The Open Security Foundation 
maintains a database of announced data breaches, which includes the number of records 
affected by a breach—but that does not include unannounced breaches.  See Open 
Security Foundation, http://opensecurityfoundation.org (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
210
 These duplications can result from address changes, name changes, or different 
spellings, for example. 
211
 See, e.g., 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179. 
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notify consumers when their data may have been compromised.212  But not 
all states have these laws and not all of these laws require telling a law 
enforcement agency or the general public about a breach.213   Some data 
breaches affect an unknown number of records, and therefore are not 
counted in breach totals.214  Any count of lost data breach records, 
therefore, only includes the number of known cases.215  The number of 
known data breaches—nearly 400 million records since 2000—is only a 
part of the total number of records affected.216 
 
[61] Because of these issues, certain assumptions must be made when 
estimating the probability that a breach will lead to identity fraud.  As 
mentioned above, data breach statistics measure records, not people, and 
understate the total number of records affected.  Nevertheless, the 
following calculations use these statistics and assume that the 
underestimations and overestimations in these numbers cancel each other 
 
                                                                                                                         
212
 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(a) (West 2008). 
213
 See Jospeh Pereira, Jennifer Levitz, & Jeremy Singer-Vine, Some Stores Quiet Over 
Card Breach, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2008, at B1 (reporting that four of the chains named 
as breach victims in FBI indictments of credit card thieves had never told their customers 
about the breaches); David L. Silverman, Data Security Breaches: The State of 
Notification Laws, 19 No. 7 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 5, 6 (2007) (noting that “a few” 
of the many state breach laws require reporting all breaches to state agencies). 
214
 See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 208 (“[f]or many of the breaches listed, 
the number of records is unknown.”). 
215
 Undetected breaches also go uncounted in this total.  No one knows how many 
undetected breaches there are, but they do happen.  The TJX breach, for example, 
operated for at least seventeen months before the company noticed. Jewell, supra note 
208, at 1E.  The breach at Heartland Payment Systems was also undetected for a few 
months.  See Eric Dash & Brad Stone, Big Breach in Card Data Raises Risk for Millions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at B4 (reporting that data thieves installed data-capturing 
software in May, but that that the breach was not discovered until late fall). 
216
 See OSF Data Loss Database, http://datalossdb.org/download (last visited Oct. 5, 
2009) [hereinafter OSF Database] (arranging breaches by date and adding the total 
number of breaches from 2000 through 2008). 
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out, or at least result in an overall underestimate.217  The calculations also 
compare annualized data for years since 2005 when data is available.218  
This comparison assumes that breached data is used as it is obtained219 and 
assumes a constant probability that breached data will be used for identity 
fraud (i.e., that this probability has not been increasing or decreasing over 
time). 
 
[62] Under these assumptions, the basic calculations are 
straightforward.  The first component is the number of records affected by 
data breach per year.  According to the Open Security Foundation (OSF) 
data breach database, organizations announced breaches of about 354 
million data records from 2005 through 2008—an average of roughly 88.5 
million records per year.220  Approximately 83.5 million records 
wereaffected in 2008.221  Thus, it seems reasonable to estimate that about 
88 million records are breached per year.222 
 
                                                                                                                         
217
 If this number underestimates the real number, it will not change a result that shows 
the rate of identity fraud to be too low to justify awarding data monitoring damages 
(because a more accurate, higher number would reduce that rate even more). 
218
 The year 2005 was chosen because that was when most states started to require data 
breach notification.  Cf. James T. Graves, Note, Minnesota’s PCI Law: A Small Step on 
the Path to a Statutory Duty of Data Security Due Care, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1115, 1118 nn.21–22 (2008). 
219
 See discussion supra note 208. 
220
 See OSF Database, supra note 216 (sorting and summing total affected records from 
2005 through 2008). 
221
 OPEN SECURITY FOUNDATION, DATA LOSS DATABASE 2008 YEARLY REPORT, 
http://datalossdb.org/yearly_reports/dataloss-2008.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).  This 
number, however, does not include the Heartland Payment Systems breach, which 
compromised an unknown—but possibly huge—number of records.  See Dash & Stone, 
supra note 215, at B4. 
222
 By comparison, the Identity Theft Resource Center reported 127.7 million records 
exposed in 2007 as well as incidents in 2006 and 2005 affecting “potentially” 19 million 
and 64.8 million “individuals,” respectively.  IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., 2007 
BREACH LIST 1 (2008), 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ITRC%20Breach%20Report%202007.pdf [hereinafter 2007 
ITRC Breach Report]; IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., 2006 DISCLOSURES OF U.S. 
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[63] The other component of the calculation is the number of identity 
fraud cases caused by data breach.  This is a two-part figure based on the 
total number of identity fraud cases multiplied by the percentage of those 
cases caused by data breach.  About eight to ten million people suffer 
identity fraud annually.223  Estimates of the percentage of identity fraud 
resulting from company-controlled data range from 12% to 26.5%.224  Data 
breach directly counts for about 5% to 11%.225  Thus, the amount of 
 
                                                                                                                         
DATA INCIDENTS 1 (2007),  
http://idtheftmostwanted.org/ITRC%20Breach%20Report%202006.pdf [hereinafter 2006 
ITRC Breach Report]; IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., 2005 DISCLOSURES OF U.S. 
DATA INCIDENTS 1 (2006), 
http://idtheftmostwanted.org/ITRC%20Breach%20Report%202005.pdf [hereinafter 2005 
ITRC Breach Report].  The ITRC numbers do not include some breaches that could 
potentially expose sensitive data but where “no actionable incident has been documented 
or disclosed.”  Id. 
223
 See 2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 5 (noting that “almost 10 million 
Americans learned they were victims of identity fraud in 2008”); 2006 FTC Survey, 
supra note 179, at 4 (extrapolating survey statistics to show that approximately 8.3 
million people suffered identity fraud in 2005). 
224
 See SASHA ROMANOSKY ET AL., DO DATA BREACH DISCLOSURE LAWS REDUCE 
IDENTITY THEFT? 8–9 (2008), http://weis2008.econinfosec.org/papers/Romanosky.pdf.  
These figures include any forms of data loss where a company arguably had control of 
the data, including theft by corrupt business employees, misuse of data from purchase or 
other transactions, and direct theft of the information from the company.  Id. at 9 n.19; 
see also 2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 7; 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at 
30.  The CIMIP study found that in the cases in which the source of data was known, 
business-controlled data accounted for half of them.  See 2007 CIMIP Report, supra note 
183, at 53.  That scales to 26.5% of all cases in that survey, when unknown cases are also 
included. See id. at 10, 53 (noting that a point of compromise could be determined in 274 
out of 517 cases); ROMANOSKY, supra at 8–9. 
225
 See 2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 7 (reporting that eleven percent of survey 
respondents who knew where misused data came from believed that the data was from a 
data breach); 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at 30 (where five percent of respondents 
said that information used in an identity fraud was obtained through a data breach). 
However, most respondents in both surveys did not know how their data was obtained. 
See 2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 7 (disclosing that its figures were based on 
the thirty five percent of respondents who they knew how their data was obtained, out of 
all 482 respondents who reported suffering identity fraud); 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 
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identity fraud resulting from data breach might be in the range of 415,000 
to 1 million incidents per year.226  A calculation of all identity frauds and 
all forms of data breach yields a 0.5% to 1% rough estimate of the rate at 
which data breach results in identity fraud.227 
 
[64] But not all types of data breach are the same.  As shown in Table 
1, the forms of data breach can be categorized by whether they resulted 
from an intentional or unintentional act, and whether they likely exposed 
data to a third party.  Some forms of data breach appear more likely to 
lead to data misuse and, thus, to identity fraud.  In particular, fraud may be 
more likely when data is intentionally exposed.  Misplaced backup tapes, 
lost laptops and stolen hardware seem less likely to result in data misuse.  
Some research supports this intuition.  For example, a GAO study of 
twenty-four large breaches was able to find data misuse in only four of 
those cases, all of which involved hacking or misrepresentation.228 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
179, at 30 (showing results that fifty six percent of survey respondents didn’t know how 
their information was taken). 
226
 Using the numbers in the 2006 FTC Survey, five percent of 8.3 million breaches 
would be 415,000 incidents attributable to data breach. See 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 
179, at 4, 30.  The Javelin numbers are eleven percent of “nearly” ten million breaches, or 
1.1 million incidents, rounded down to one million to allow for the word “nearly.”  See 
2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 5, 7. 
227
 See discussion supra notes 220, 226 and accompanying text (dividing the FTC and 
Javelin numbers by the estimated number of records breached from 2005 through 2008). 
228
 See 2007 GAO Report, supra note 15, at 24, 26. 
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Table 1:  Forms of Data Breach 
 
[65] Data breach likelihood calculations should consider this.  A 
plaintiff who seeks monitoring costs following a hacking-related breach 
probably has a greater chance of suffering identity fraud than a plaintiff 
who sues after a laptop is lost; their claims should not be treated the same.  
Likewise, as discussed in Part V.A, not all forms of identity fraud have the 
same cost.  Existing-account fraud, especially on credit-card accounts, 
presents a particularly low risk for the consumer because of laws limiting 
liability.229  Therefore, the appropriate calculation might not be the total 
amount of identity fraud resulting from all data breaches, but rather, the 
rate at which new account fraud results from intentional, data-exposing 
breaches such as hacking, social engineering, and fraud. 
 
[66] The more focused calculation increases the probability estimate.  
From 2005 through 2008, about 4.8 million Social Security number 
records per year were compromised in data breaches that involved 
hacking, social engineering or fraud.230  About one in five identity fraud 
 
                                                                                                                         
229
 See discussion supra note 181. 
230
 The OSF database, when filtered to report only totals for Fraud and Hacking events, 
shows forty-six million records in 2005, 8.5 million records in 2006, 121 million records 
in 2007, and 20.7 million records in 2008, for total of 196.2 million records.  See OSF 
Database, supra note 216.  When those results are further filtered to show only breaches 
that disclose Social Security numbers, the type of data most useful in new account fraud, 
 
 Intentional Act Unintentional Act 
Data  
Exposed 
Fraud, Hacking, Social 
Engineering, Viruses, 
Stolen Documents 
Accidental disclosure 
through mail, Internet, 
or e-mail 
Data Not  
Exposed 
Stolen media, backup 
tapes, or computer 
Lost documents, drives, 
computers, or media 
 
Improperly disposed 
documents, drives, 
computers, or media 
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cases are new-account frauds.231  If 5% to 11% of those are the result of 
data breach,232 then somewhere around 100,000 to 170,000 new account 
fraud cases result from fraud and hacking incidents each year.233  Dividing 
the 170,000 by 4.8 million gives about one in twenty-eight estimated 
chance (or 3.5% probability) that a record in a data breach involving fraud 
or hacking of Social Security numbers will be used for new account fraud. 
 
C.  COST AND EFFECTIVENESS OF REMEDIAL MEASURES 
 
[67] Several methods exist to try to mitigate the effects of data loss.  
This section discusses some of the more common data loss remediation 
measures, their costs, and their effectiveness at avoiding loss. 
 
1.  CREDIT MONITORING 
 
[68] Credit monitoring is one of the most common reactions to data 
loss.  It has become common practice for organizations to offer free credit 
monitoring after a breach; the monitoring is usually offered for a limited 
period, such as a year or two.234  As discussed in Part II.A, plaintiffs have 
also sought—without success—to recover the costs of additional credit 
monitoring beyond the free period. 
 
                                                                                                                         
the total number of accounts affected since 2005 drops to 19.2 million.  Calculating that 
as an annualized number gives 4.8 million per year. 
231
 See 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at 4, 12 (showing 0.8% of respondents 
claiming new account fraud, representing 22% out of the 3.7% who reported some form 
of identity fraud); 2005 BJS Survey, supra note 181, at 1 (showing that 1,083,100, or 
16.85%, of the 6,426,200 estimated households that reported any form of identity fraud 
reported new account fraud). 
232
 See discussion supra note 225.  Note that this simple calculation ignores the real 
possibility that data breaches could be disproportionately responsible for new account 
fraud. 
233
 Using the FTC numbers gives 21.6% of 415,000 = 89,640.  See supra notes 226, 231. 
Combining the BJS numbers with Javelin’s higher estimate for the number of frauds 
resulting from data breach gives 16.85% of 1,000,000 = 168,500.  See supra note 231. 
234
 2007 GAO Report, supra note 15, at 35. 
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[69] Offered primarily by the three credit reporting bureaus, credit 
monitoring products allow increased access to credit reports.  Although 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act entitles everyone to one free credit report 
per year,235 credit monitoring enables unlimited access to one’s credit 
report and, optionally, credit score.236  The services typically alert the 
subscriber when credit information changes.237  Credit monitoring often 
includes identity theft insurance, which promises to pay for certain costs 
of responding to identity fraud.238  Each credit reporting bureau offers 
credit monitoring products that monitor only its own credit reports, or, for 
a higher price, products that monitor all three credit bureau reports.239  
Credit monitoring services that monitor all three bureaus currently cost 
about fifteen dollars per month.240 
 
                                                                                                                         
235
 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
236
 See Credit Monitoring, http://www.thecredittruth.org/credit-monitoring.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
237
 For example, Equifax lists the following types of notifications customers of its credit 
monitoring service could expect to receive: “New accounts opened in your name; credit 
inquiries resulting from a company requesting a copy of your credit report; an address 
change; bankruptcies and other public records; some changes to current accounts; balance 
increase alerts based on a self-selected dollar amount or percentage.”  Equifax Credit 
Watch FAQs, http://www.equifax.com/cs/Satellite/EFX_Content_C1/1175248697129/5-
1/5-1_Layout.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
238
 See Consumer Reports Money Adviser, Costly Credit-Monitoring Services Offer 
Limited Fraud Protection, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/money/credit-loan/costly-
credit-monitoring-services-offer-limited-fraud-protection-4-07/overview/0704_costly-
credit-monitoring-services-offer-limited-fraud-
protection_ov.htm?Extkey=SY95PI0&CMP=KNC-
CROVMYSSP&HBX_OU=51&PK=yssp (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
239
 See, e.g., Equifax 3-in-1 Monitoring With 4 FICO Scores, 
http://www.equifax.com/3in1-monitoring-with-4-fico-scores (last visited Oct. 5, 2009); 
Triple Advantage, http://www.experian.com/consumer-products/triple-advantage.html 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2009); TrueCredit, 
http://www.truecredit.com/3BCM?AID=104475848-PID=19119618-SID=-credit-report-
monitoring-truecredit_review.php--2009-09-21--23-44-05 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).  
240
 See, e.g., Equifax 3-in-1 Monitoring With 4 FICO Scores, 
http://www.equifax.com/3in1-monitoring-with-4-fico-scores (last visited Oct. 5, 2009); 
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[70] Although popular, credit monitoring products have a number of 
problems.  They only notify subscribers when something bad has already 
happened; this allows quicker response to a fraud, but does not prevent the 
fraud.241  Credit monitoring only monitors financial information that 
appears on a credit report.242  If data is misused non-financially or in a way 
that is not tied to the consumer’s social security number, credit monitoring 
will not detect it.243  Credit monitoring, therefore, is useless against illegal 
use of a social security number to avoid tax or employment laws, when 
given to a law enforcement officer during arrest, or in medical identity 
fraud.244  Credit monitoring also cannot detect unauthorized charges on 
existing accounts.245  Finally, the insurance included in credit monitoring 
products can be less than valuable due to limitations and gaps in 
coverage.246 
 
[71] For these reasons, credit monitoring has limited usefulness.  As 
such, courts have failed to find such monitoring to be reasonably 
necessary. 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
Triple Advantage, http://www.experian.com/consumer-products/triple-advantage.html 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2009); TrueCredit, 
http://www.truecredit.com/3BCM?AID=104475848-PID=19119618-SID=-credit-report-
monitoring-truecredit_review.php--2009-09-21--23-44-05 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).  
241
 See Kelli B. Grant, 4 Reasons to Forego Credit Monitoring Services, SMARTMONEY, 
July 14, 2008, http://www.smartmoney.com/spending/deals/4-reasons-to-forgo-credit-
monitoring-services-23454. 
242
 See Collins, supra note 182; Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Straight Talk About 
Identity Theft Monitoring Services, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs33-
CreditMonitoring.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
243
 See Collins, supra note 182; Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 242. 
244
 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 242. 
245
 Id. 
246
 See Consumer Reports Money Adviser, supra note 238. 
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2.  CREDIT FREEZES 
 
[72] The credit freeze is another option for people worried about 
identity fraud.  A credit freeze blocks all access to a consumer’s credit 
report, preventing, rather than merely monitoring, new account fraud as 
long as the freeze is active.247  A credit freeze prevents fraudulent new 
accounts in the consumer’s name because the seller of services cannot 
check the consumer’s credit report.248  Freezing credit reports first became 
an option with the passage of several state laws; the credit reporting 
bureaus responded with plans to announce nationwide credit freeze 
availability.249 
 
[73] Although laws in forty-seven states and the District of Columbia 
allow consumers to freeze their credit reports,250 the laws differ on how 
 
                                                                                                                         
247
 See Security Freeze, http://www.experian.com/consumer/security_freeze.html (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
248
 See Eve Mitchell, Putting Freeze on Identity Theft, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Cal.), Nov. 
12, 2007. 
249
 Jane J. Kim, More People Are Freezing Credit Reports; Fearful of ID Theft; 
Consumers Block Access to Their Records; A Quick Thaw, Made Easier, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 24, 2007, at D1. 
250
 See ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.48.010–.995 (Westlaw 2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-
1698 (Supp. 2008); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 4-112-101 to 4-112-113 (Supp. 2007); CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 1785.11.2 (West Supp. 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-14.3-106.6 
(West Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36a-701 to 36a-701a (Supp. 2008); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2201–2203 (Supp. 2006); 2007-3 D.C. Code Adv. Leg. Serv. 33–39 
(LexisNexis); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.005 (West Supp. 2008); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-
913 to -915 (Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489P-3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. §§ 28-52-101 to -109 (Supp. 2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2MM 
(West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-24-1 to -18 (West Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 714G.1–.11 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-
702(j), 50-723, 50-724 (Supp. 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.365 (LexisNexis 2008); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3571.1(H)(5), 9:3571(M)–(Y) (Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit., 10 §§ 1312(10-C), 1313-C to –E (Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 
14-1212.1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93 §§ 50, 56(b), 62A 
(West Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. §§ 13C.016–.019 (2008); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-
201 to -217 (Supp. 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1726 to -1736 (2007); NEB. REV. 
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much the consumer must pay to freeze or unfreeze the report.251  Most 
laws allow identity fraud victims to freeze or unfreeze their credit reports 
for free.252  Depending on the jurisdiction, consumers who are not victims 
of identity fraud may have to pay to place a freeze,253 remove a freeze,254 
 
                                                                                                                         
STAT. ANN. §§ 8-2601 to -2615 (Supp. 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 598C.105, 
598C.300–.390 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-B:22 to :26 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-11-46 to -50 (West Supp. 2008); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3A-01 to -06 (West Supp. 2008); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380-t 
(McKinney Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-63 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 
51-33-01 to -14 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.52 (West, Westlaw through 2008 
File 129); OKLA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 149–159 (West 2008); ORE. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
646A.606–.618, 646A.624 (West Supp. 2008); 73 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 2501–2510 (West 
2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-48-1 to -7 (Supp. 2008); Financial Identity Fraud and 
Identity Theft Protection Act, 2008 S.C. Act 190 (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 
37-20-110(16), 37-20-160); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 54-15-1 to -16 (Supp. 2008); TENN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-2101 to -2110 (Supp. 2008); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 
20.034–.04 (Vernon Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-45-101 to -401 (Supp. 2008); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2480h (2006); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-444.1 to -444.2 (Supp. 
2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.170 (West 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-
6L-101 to -105 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.54 (West Supp. 2008); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-501 to -509 (2007). 
251
 Letter from Jeannine Kenney & Gail Hillebrand, Senior Policy Analyst & Senior 
Attorney, Consumers Union, to Federal Trade Commission (Feb. 25, 2008), at 5, 
available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/FTC-Comments-Security-Freeze.pdf. 
252
 See CHRISTOPHER WOLF, PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY § 5:5.5[B][11] (2009) (Tanya L. 
Forsheit & Kristen J. Mathews eds. 2009) (2006). 
253
 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2203(b)(13) (2009) (allowing a twenty dollar charge 
for a consumer’s initial credit freeze, after which all freeze-related activity must be free); 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-2607 to -2609 (Supp. 2008) (allowing a $3 fee to place a 
freeze, with free removal or temporary lifting of the freeze); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
444.2 (Supp. 2008) (allowing a ten dollar fee to place a freeze, but no fee for removal or 
temporary lifting). 
254
 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-14.3-106.6(12)(c) (West Supp. 2008) (allowing 
a ten dollar fee to remove a freeze, but no fee to place the freeze); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 
380-t (n)(2) (McKinney Supp. 2008) (allowing a five dollar fee to remove or temporarily 
lift a freeze, but no fee to place the first freeze). 
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both,255 or neither.256  Consumers in some states may also temporarily 
freeze their credit reports for less than the cost of placing and then lifting a 
freeze.257 
 
[74] Credit freezes are no panacea, but they are more effective than 
credit monitoring.258  As with credit monitoring, credit freezes cannot 
prevent existing account fraud or forms of identity fraud that do not 
require credit.259  Credit freezes can also be more of a hassle than credit 
monitoring.  Unlike the all-in-one credit monitoring services, a credit 
freeze must be placed separately with each reporting bureau.260  Placing or 
lifting a freeze takes time, so consumers with frozen credit cannot get 
“instant credit” or other loans unless they plan ahead by lifting the 
 
                                                                                                                         
255
 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1698(K) (Supp. 2008) (allowing a five dollar 
fee to place, remove, or temporarily lift a freeze); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.11.2(m) (West 
Supp. 2008) (allowing credit bureaus to charge a ten dollar fee to place or remove a 
freeze); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-914(p) (Supp. 2008) (allowing a three dollar fee to place, 
remove, or temporarily lift a freeze); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2108(l) (Supp. 2008) 
(allowing a $7.50 fee to place a freeze, a five dollar fee to remove the freeze, and no fee 
to temporarily lift a freeze).  
256
 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-24-14 (West Supp. 2008); Financial Identity Fraud 
and Identity Theft Protection Act, 2008 S.C. Act 190, sec. 2, § 37-120-160(J), available 
at http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess117_2007-2008/bills/453.htm.  
257
 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.11.2(m) (West Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 36a-701a(i) (Supp. 2008) (allowing a ten dollar fee to temporarily lift a credit 
freeze). 
258
 See, e.g., Manny Vetti, Credit Freeze Or Credit Monitoring? Best Ways to Fight 
Identity Theft, http://ezinearticles.com/?Credit-Freeze-Or-Credit-Monitoring?--Best-
Ways-to-Fight-Identity-Theft&id=1389620 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
259
 Cf. Mitchell, supra note 248 (noting that “access to a consumer’s credit reports and 
credit scores cannot be shared” unless specific permission is given) (emphasis added). 
260
 Claire Moore, Security Freeze or Fraud Alert, Aug. 30, 2009, 
http://www.examiner.com/x-6044-Financial-Literacy-Examiner~y2009m8d30-Security-
freeze-or-fraud-alert (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
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freeze.261  The reporting bureaus also make the credit freeze process 
relatively difficult, often forcing the consumer to “jump through hoops” to 
freeze their credit files.262    
 
[75] Security freezes are also cheaper than credit monitoring.  Even in 
states where placing and lifting a credit freeze is the most expensive, a 
consumer can place and temporarily lift a credit freeze several times for 
the cost of three-bureau credit monitoring.263  Perhaps the low cost of 
placing credit freezes explains why plaintiffs do not seek damages 
resulting from the cost of placing credit freezes.264 
 
3.  FRAUD ALERTS 
 
[76] Fraud alerts are another possible response to data loss.  The Fair 
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003 included 
provisions enabling fraud alerts.265  A fraud alert is a statement in a credit 
 
                                                                                                                         
261
 Business advocacy groups have been quick to cite this barrier to instant credit as one 
of the problems with credit freeze laws. See, e.g., Minn. Senate, Commerce Committee 
Update, Apr. 3, 2006, http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/committee/2005-
2006/commerce/update.htm (reporting Minnesota Business Association comments that a 
proposed credit freeze law could cause problems with instant credit). 
262
 See Marni Ginther, Icy Start for Credit Freeze, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 23, 
2006, at 1A.  
263
 The states in which credit freezes are most expensive allow credit bureaus to charge 
ten dollars per bureau for placing or removing a freeze, and twelve dollars to temporarily 
lift a freeze. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 714G.5 (West 2008). For the $180 annual price of 
three-bureau credit monitoring, a consumer in these states could place a freeze then 
temporarily lift it four times per year. Most states are cheaper.  For example, residents of 
Minnesota, which caps credit freeze fees at five dollars, could place a credit freeze and 
temporarily lift it at all three bureaus ten times per year for the same price as a credit-
monitoring service. See MINN. STAT. § 13C.016, subdiv. 8 (2008). See also supra note 
240 and accompanying text. 
264
 Security freezes may also be underutilized by fraud victims.  According to the 2006 
FTC identity theft survey, only seven percent of victims of identity fraud froze their 
credit reports.  2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at 48.  
265
 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1(a)(1) (2006). 
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file that tells anyone looking at it that “the consumer may be a victim of 
fraud.”266  An initial fraud alert, which can be activated by anyone who 
“asserts in good faith a suspicion that the consumer has been or is about to 
become a victim of fraud or related crime,”267 lasts for ninety days.268  An 
extended fraud alert lasts for seven years,269 but is only available to 
consumers who have suffered identity fraud.270  Prospective creditors who 
receive a credit report tagged with an initial fraud alert must use 
“reasonable policies and procedures” to “form a reasonable belief” that the 
request is authorized.271  If the credit report is tagged with an extended 
alert, then the prospective creditor must contact the consumer in person or 
by phone to confirm her application.272  
 
[77] The greatest weakness in this system, from the victim’s 
perspective, is that a fraud alert is only available for ninety days, unless 
the victim has already suffered fraud.273  A few enterprising souls have 
attempted to fix this problem with businesses that repeatedly place initial 
fraud alerts on a consumer’s credit record, essentially creating a 
continuous fraud alert for as long as the consumer pays for the service.274  
 
                                                                                                                         
266
 Id. § 1681a(q)(2). 
267
 Id. § 1681c-1(a)(1). 
268
 Id. § 1681c-1(a)(1)(A).  The consumer may request that the fraud alert be removed 
before the ninety-day period. Id. 
269
 Id. § 1681c-1(b)(1)(A).  The consumer can also request an early end to an extended 
fraud alert. 
270
 Id. § 1681c-1(b)(1). 
271
 Id. § 1681c-2(h)(1)(B).  An open-end credit plan may be extended without this check. 
Id. 
272
 Id. § 1681c-2(h)(2)(B).  Open-end credit plans are not subject to this requirement, 
either. Id.   
273
 See discussion supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
274
 See Ron Lieber, Outspoken Champion of Identity Protection Tussles With Skeptics, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2008, at C1 (discussing LifeLock).     
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The most notorious of these services, LifeLock, has drawn legal trouble 
from its customers,275 the state of Oklahoma,276 and Experian.277 
 
[78] Fraud alerts also share a problem with credit monitoring and credit 
freezes.  Fraud alerts do no protect against non-financial forms of fraud 
and cannot prevent unauthorized charges to existing accounts.278  But 
unlike credit monitoring and credit freezes, fraud alerts are free.279  Despite 
that advantage, few identity fraud victims have used fraud alerts.280  
 
D.  PUTTING THE NUMBERS TOGETHER 
 
[79] The available data shows that: 
 
• The average overall cost of new account fraud is anywhere 
from $1620 to $49,941 per victim.281 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
275
 Associated Press, Lifelock Customers Sue Owners, Cry Fraud, May 23, 2008, 
available at http://www2.journalnow.com/content/2008/may/23/lifelock-customers-sue-
owner-cry-fraud/business-nationworld. 
276
 Lieber, supra note 274. Oklahoma claims that LifeLock is selling insurance without a 
license through its one million dollar guarantee.  Id. 
277
 Id.    
278
 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO BUY OR NOT TO BUY: IDENTITY THEFT SPAWNS NEW 
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES TO HELP MINIMIZE RISK 1–2 (2007), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/idtheft/idt05.pdf. 
279
 See § 1681c-1(a)(1), 1681c-1(b)(1) (requiring initial and extended fraud alerts to be 
placed “upon . . . request”). 
280
 See 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at 46–48 (showing that only fourteen percent 
of victims placed an initial ninety-day fraud alert with a credit agency, and only seven 
percent placed seven-year extended alerts). 
281
 See discussion supra Part V.A. 
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• The largest estimated probability that an intentional data breach 
involving a Social Security Number will lead to new-account 
identity fraud is roughly one in twenty-eight, or 3.5%.282   
 
• Available means of reducing new account identity fraud have 
mixed effectiveness.283  
 
[80] Most plaintiffs have sought credit monitoring as their form of 
relief.284  The cheapest three-bureau credit monitoring service costs $180 
per year.285  To buy just five years of credit monitoring beyond the one or 
two years most organizations offer for free after a breach, a data breach 
victim would have to pay $900.286  Suppose, for the sake of argument, that 
(1) credit monitoring is one hundred percent effective at preventing new 
account fraud; (2) that the ITRC is right about the cost of new account 
identity fraud being nearly $50,000; and (3) that the one in twenty-eight 
chance of a hack leading to new-account identity fraud is in the ballpark of 
accurate.287   
 
                                                                                                                         
282
 See discussion supra Part V.B. 
283
 See discussion supra Part V.C. 
284
 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
285
 See Triple Advantage, supra note 239. 
286
 The five-year example period was chosen as a potentially reasonable time period for 
credit monitoring.  Data monitoring plaintiffs’ complaints have not specified how long 
they thought credit monitoring should last.  See, e.g., First Amended Class Action 
Complaint and Jury Demand at 13, Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P., 486 F. Supp. 2d 
705 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (No. 1:05CV756), 2006 WL 430509 (seeking an order requiring 
the defendant to “establish a credit monitoring program”); Complaint at 11, Hendricks v. 
DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 1:05-cv-
00767), 2005 WL 3518203 (seeking “[d]amages sufficient to pay for the monitoring of 
credit reports and accounts”); Complaint and Jury Demand at 15, Giordano v. Wachovia 
Secs., L.L.C., No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036 (D. N.J. July 31, 2006) (No. AT2-L-3567-
05), 2005 WL 4255487 (seeking an order requiring the defendant to “establish a credit 
monitoring program”).   
287
 This clearly is not the case, but it is the simplest way to proceed, and makes little 
difference in the final result. 
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[81] Based on these suppositions, the expected cost of a breach would 
be $1770 per person.  Five years of credit monitoring costs a little over 
half as much as the expected cost of the breach.288  To economically justify 
allowing data monitoring costs, the aggregate cost savings should be 
significant enough to overcome any doubt that the cost savings are real 
and outweigh other drawbacks.  This hypothetical illustrates that there is 
no such savings with post-breach credit monitoring.   
 
[82] The hypothetical uses numbers that were as favorable to 
maximizing the expected value of loss as reasonably possible.  For 
example, the total amount of breached data was probably an 
underestimate.289  The total cost of new-account identity fraud, $50,000, 
was an order of magnitude higher than other estimates of these costs.290 
The credit monitoring cost was calculated using the least expensive 
service available.  The calculation also assumed that credit monitoring 
completely prevents identity fraud.  Yet, even with these favorable 
numbers, the cost factors still do not support recovery for credit 
monitoring costs after a data breach.291  Given available data, it 
isimpossible to construct a calculation favoring recovery that does not 
strain credulity.292   
 
                                                                                                                         
288
 See discussion supra Part V.C.1. 
289
 See discussion supra notes 213–16 and accompanying text. 
290
 See discussion supra notes 198–201 and accompanying text. 
291
 Note again that these costs are based on averages and aggregates.  Some individual 
data breach victims will suffer identity fraud that will cost them tens of thousands of 
dollars.  The FTC’s data suggests that at least ten percent of identity fraud victims will 
lose more than ten thousand dollars.  See 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at 5. But 
these individual cases do not make for an overall aggregate economic benefit in allowing 
medical monitoring costs. 
292
 The most favorable calculation possible would assume that: (1) the average cost of 
new-account identity fraud is $50,000; (2) credit monitoring is 100% effective at 
eliminating the risk of identity fraud; and (3) all or most of the unknown causes of 
identity fraud in the FTC and Javelin surveys are data breaches, and fifty-six percent of 
annual identity frauds are the result of data breaches.  See 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 
179, at 30.  In that case, the probability that a data breach involving fraud or hacking of 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XVI, Issue 1 
 59
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
[83] The courts that have rejected post-breach credit monitoring claims 
are right, but for the wrong reasons.  Recovery for monitoring after data 
breach should be denied, not because data breach is insufficiently like 
exposure to toxins, but because plaintiffs have not shown that these 
measures are reasonably necessary.  The relationship between the cost of 
monitoring, the potential cost of identity fraud, and the likelihood that data 
breach will lead to identity fraud suggests that it is currently only slightly 
more expensive, at worst, to wait for identity fraud than to pay for 
monitoring up-front.  But this could change over time, especially for 
intentional forms of data compromise.  Instead of dismissing these claims 
for insufficient similarity to medical claims, courts should evaluate them 
based on whether the remedial measures are reasonably necessary, 
weighing such factors as cost effectiveness of those measures and placing 
the burden on the plaintiff to show reasonable necessity.  
 
                                                                                                                         
Social Security numbers will lead to new-account fraud would be 23.3% (5.6 million 
identity frauds x .20 ratio of new-account frauds to total identity frauds)/4.8 million fraud 
or hacking data breaches that involve Social Security numbers).  With all those stars 
aligned, the expected cost of a data breach would be $11,666, but the assumptions needed 
to get to that number stretch too far.  If the cost of new-account identity fraud is closer to 
the $4850 the BJS survey found, the expected cost of a breach drops to $1130—only 
$230 more than the cost of five years of the lowest-price credit monitoring.  See 2005 
BJS Survey, supra note 181, at 5. 
